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This symposium is based on papers and discussion presented at the Pro-
fessional Responsibility Section panel at the annual meeting of the American
Association of Law Schools in Washington, D.C., on January 4, 2003. Pro-
fessor Robert Cochran served as moderator and presented an introduction.
Members of the panel, Professors Deborah Rhode, Paul Tremblay, and
Thomas Shaffer presented three different approaches to moral issues that
arise in the client counseling relationship. This may have been the first time
that leaders of each of these approaches to client counseling have gotten to-
gether for such a discussion. The presentations were followed by questions
from the floor. All of the authors, as well as those people who raised ques-
tions, were given the opportunity to edit their comments for this symposium
edition.
I. INTRODUCTION: THREE APPROACHES TO MORAL ISSUES IN LAW OFFICE
COUNSELING
Robert F. Cochran, Jr.*
One of the most important challenges to lawyers and clients is address-
ing issues that are not controlled by law. Will the client take steps (legal
steps) that will harm other people? Will the officers of a corporation con-
sider the effects of its actions on workers, on consumers, on the community,
on the environment? In a divorce, will the client take actions that will harm
a child or spouse? What role should the lawyer play regarding these ques-
tions? The way lawyers address such issues may do more to determine
whether their practice is socially useful or socially harmful than any rule
governing the profession. The way lawyers address these issues is also
likely to have a great deal to do with whether they find the practice of law
personally satisfying.'
The rules of the profession do not completely ignore the question of
moral counsel. ABA Model Rule (MR) 2.1 states, "[i]n rendering advice, a
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral,
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's
situation.",2 This "rule" is not really a rule. It states that "a lawyer may"
raise such factors.' It is more like one of the Ethical Considerations (ECs) of
* Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; J.D., University of
Virginia. Many thanks to Sam Levine for his comments on an earlier draft.
1. Several books and articles have explored the place of lawyer/client moral discourse. See
THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1994); MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE HOFFMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS'
ETHICS 60-62 (2d ed. 2002); DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN & SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS
COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 282-84 (1991); ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D.
HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE
REPRESENTATION 334-38 (1990); ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., JOHN M.A. DIPIPPA & MARTHA M.
PETERS, THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING (1999); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-at-Law: Lessons
From Dostoyevsky, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 327 (1998); Jack L. Sammons, Rank Strangers to Me: Shaffer
and Cochran 's Friendship Model of Moral Counseling in the Law Office, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L.J. 1 (1995); Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers as Strangers and Friends: A
Reply to Professor Sammons, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 69 (1995).
2. ABA Model Rules of Prof I Conduct, MR 2.1 (2002).
3. Id. It is probably best that there is not a rule governing the role that lawyers play as to such
issues in legal representation-the counseling role requires discretion.
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the earlier ABA Model Code which set aspirational standards for the profes-
sion. This portion of MR 2.1 is in fact a weakened version of EC 7-8, which
stated, "[i]n assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desir-
able for a lawyer to point out those factors which may lead to a decision that
is morally just as well as legally permissible ... Note several differences
between the standards. First, MR 2.1 presumes a somewhat directive law-
yer-the lawyer is "rendering advice."5 EC 7-8 presumes a more collabora-
tive lawyer-the lawyer is "assisting his client to reach a proper decision" and
"point[ing] out" various factors. The rules also vary in the strength with
which they encourage lawyers to raise moral concerns. MR 2.1 is merely
permissive-"a lawyer may ..... 7 EC7-8 is a little more directive-"it is of-
ten desirable . . . ,8 Finally, each provision reflects a somewhat different
moral viewpoint. MR 2.1 is more relativist-a lawyer may refer to "moral"
factors along with "economic, social and political" factors.9 EC 7-8 is more
traditional-it assumes that some decisions are "morally just."' 10
Over recent decades, three schools of thought have emerged among le-
gal ethicists and legal clinicians concerning the lawyer's role as to moral is-
sues in the counseling relationship. Those approaches are directive, client-
centered, and collaborative. Each provides a different combination of an-
swers to the following questions: 1) Who controls the important decisions in
the relationship? and 2) Are the interests of people other than the client taken
into consideration in making those decisions?
I admit up front that I am not a neutral observer of this discussion. My
preference is for the collaborative approach, though I appreciate the argu-
ments for each of the other schools of thought. I also admit that the lines be-
tween the schools of thought are not as clear as I might suggest. As you read
the essays that follow this one, you will see that each writer is influenced by
the same concerns that influence the others. Nevertheless, each balances
them a bit differently in developing his or her approach.
4. ABA Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility, EC 7-8 (2002). A few jurisdictions continue to
follow the Model Code.
5. ABA Model Rules of Prof I Conduct, MR 2.1 (2002).
6. ABA Model Code of Prof I Responsibility, EC 7-8 (2002).
7. ABA Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct, MR 2.1 (2002).
8. ABA Model Code of Prof I Responsibility, EC 7-8 (2002).
9. ABA Model Rules of Prof I Conduct, MR 2.1 (2002).
10. ABA Model Code of Prof I Responsibility, EC 7-8 (2002).
593
A. The Directive Approach
The first school of lawyering advocates a directive lawyer, a lawyer who
is willing to assert control of moral issues that arise during legal representa-
tion. Along with Professors David Luban and William Simon, Professor
Deborah Rhode, whose essay appears in this colloquium, has proposed a
lawyer who is likely to take control of moral issues that arise during the rep-
resentation. In her book, In the Interests of Justice, Rhode argues that
"[l]awyers can, and should, act on the basis of their own principled convic-
tions, even when they recognize that others could in good faith hold different
views."" David Luban argues in his book, The Good Lawyer, that "when
professional and moral obligations conflict, moral obligations take prece-
dence.' 2 Rhode and Luban provide little, if any, discussion of the role that
the client might play in determining what moral standards should control the
representation.
William Simon argues in his book, The Practice of Justice, that
"[1]awyers should take those actions that, considering the relevant circum-
stances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice.""
"Justice" here connotes the basic values of the legal system and sub-
sumes many layers of more concrete norms. Decisions about justice
are not assertions of personal preferences, nor are they applications
of ordinary morality. They are legal judgments grounded in the
methods and sources of authority of the professional culture. I use
"justice" interchangeably with "legal merit." 4
Under Simon's model, the lawyer looks to the values underlying the
law to resolve the moral issues. This model clearly leaves the lawyer in
charge of the moral issues that arise in legal representation. Simon's criteria
for making decisions during the representation are beyond the understanding
of the ordinary client. In Simon's formulation, "justice" is a technical issue
11. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 58
(2000). Rhode prefers the title "contextual" rather than "directive" for her theory of lawyer/client
counseling. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics in Counseling, supra at text accompanying note 43-45.
She argues that a case's context should determine the lawyer's response. In that respect, she is in
agreement with the collaborative school of legal counseling. See infra at text accompanying notes
36-39. 1 include Rhode within the directive school of legal counseling because she, as well as Luban
and Simon, appear to be much more willing than those in the other schools of client counseling to
assert control of moral issues that arise in the lawyer/client relationship.
12. DAVID LUBAN, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES
AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 118 (David Luban ed., 1984).
13. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 138
(1998). It may be that there will not be a great deal of difference between Deborah Rhode's "[law-
yers'] own principled convictions" standard and Simon's "legal ideals" standard. The "legal ideals"
that a lawyer discerns are likely to look a lot like the lawyer's ideals. There is a danger that Simon's
model will cloak the lawyer's moral judgment in legal jargon, giving it the authority of law.
14. Id. at 138.
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for legal experts.15 Simon's model places moral judgment on the lawyer's
turf.16
The directive lawyer is part of a venerable tradition among American
lawyers. 7 David Hoffman, who in the 1830s drafted the first guidelines for
American lawyers, said, "[the client] shall never make me a partner in his
knavery."' 8 Judge George Sharswood said, "[i]t is in some measure the duty
of counsel to be the keeper of the conscience of the client; not to suffer him,
through the influence of his feelings or interest, to do or say anything
wrong...",,1 9 Judge Clement Haynsworth put it, "[T]he lawyer must never
forget that he is the master. He is not there to do the client's bidding. It is
for the lawyer to decide what is morally and legally right.,
20
Unlike the other two schools of lawyering represented in this sympo-
sium, the directive school has not developed its theory into a step-by-step
method of client counseling. What does the conversation between lawyer
and client look like when the lawyer decides that moral concerns should in-
fluence the representation? Does the lawyer persuade the client to adopt her
viewpoint? Does the lawyer threaten to withdraw if the client does not agree
with her? Or, as William Simon's theory might suggest, does the lawyer
merely present her conclusions of what justice requires as being what the
law requires?
There are troubling aspects of the directive approach. First, there is the
danger that, as to moral issues arising in the representation, the lawyer will
be wrong. Humility is justified when approaching such issues. These issues
15. The task which Simon identifies for lawyers seeking to identify justice requires highly tech-
nical legal judgment. He identifies three tensions which lawyers face in making such judgments:
substance versus procedure, purpose versus form, and broad versus narrow framing. SIMON, supra
note 13, at 139-56. For a discussion of the highly technical ("exceedingly professorial") nature of
the determination that Simon envisions, see David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51
STAN. L. REV. 873, 893-95 (1999).
16. For a further treatment of Simon's arguments, see Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Rule of
Law(yers): A Review Essay of William H. Simon's The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers'
Ethics, 65 Mo. L. REV. 572 (2000).
17. Simon praises the ethical precepts of Hoffman and Sharswood. SIMON, supra note 13, at 63-
64. See also, RHODE supra note II at 51 (praising Hoffman, but suggesting that Sharswood was am-
bivalent about the role of the lawyer; Rhode quotes Sharswood's assertions that the lawyer is "not
morally responsible for... maintaining an unjust cause" and should not assist a client who is "aiming
to perpetrate a wrong" (quoting George Sharswood, Essay on Professional Ethics, 84-85 (3d ed.
1869)).
18. THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION
TOPICS 64 (1985) (quoting DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-54 (2d ed. 1836)).
19. Id. at 225 (quoting George Sharswood, Essay on Professional Ethics (1854).
20. Clement F. Haynsworth, Professionalism in Lawyering, 27 S.C. L. Rev. 627, 628 (1976),
quoted in FREEDMAN & HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 52. For a more developed critique of the direc-
tive approach, see SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 1, at 30-39.
are likely to be difficult. I do not suggest that there are not objective moral
standards, but none of us has perfect ability to discern those standards or to
determine how they should apply. There is a danger that lawyers will be
confident of their moral judgment when confidence is not justified. Gener-
ally, two consciences in conversation are more likely to get to moral truth
than one.
A second concern is that the directive lawyer is likely to impose her val-
ues on the client. Directive lawyering is inconsistent with client dignity.
There is no place in the directive lawyer's office for the morals of the client.
The lawyer robs the client of the opportunity to grow morally. People grow
morally through exercising moral judgment. They develop virtues through
practice, as an athlete develops physical skills through practice. Lawyers
who prevent clients from moral exercise-from deliberating, making moral
judgments, and acting on them-deny clients the opportunity to become bet-
ter people.
B. The Client-Centered Approach
"Client-centered counseling"'" is designed to craft legal solutions which
satisfy client interests. David Binder, Paul Bergman, and Susan Price, the
founders of the client-centered approach, in their Lawyers as Counselors: A
Client-Centered Approach, state: "Because client autonomy is of paramount
importance, decisions should be made on the basis of what choice is most
likely to provide a client with maximum satis ction."22 Paul Tremblay, who
contributes an essay to this symposium, will join Binder, Bergman, and
Price in the next edition of that book. Other leaders of the client-centered
school include Robert Bastress and Joseph Harbaugh.23
In the client-centered view, the lawyer should not act in ways that would
influence the client's choice. The lawyer should be "neutral" 24 and "non-
judgmental. 2 5 Whereas the client has a very limited role in resolving moral
issues under the directive model, the lawyer has a very limited role in resolv-
ing such issues under the client-centered model. 26 The danger for the client-
21. See BINDER ET AL, supra note 1; BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 1; and DAVID A.
BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH (1977).
22. BINDER ET AL, supra note I, at 261 (original emphasis). See also BASTRESS & HARBAUGH,
supra note I, at 256.
23. See BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note I.
24. BINDER & PRICE, supra note 21, at 166; BINDER ET AL, supra note 1, at 288-89.
25. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 1, at 57.
26. The client-centered counselors suggest that the lawyer might legitimately raise moral con-
cers when the client makes a decision which the lawyer believes is "morally wrong." The lawyer
might try and persuade the client to change his mind. See BASTRESS & HARBAUGH supra note 1, at
334-35, and BINDER ET AL., supra note I, at 282-84. However, there are likely to be problems with
moral discourse at this stage.
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centered lawyer is that she becomes merely a hired gun in the hands of the
client.27
When a decision is to be made in legal representation, the client-
centered lawyer and the client list on a sheet of paper all of the alternative
courses of action and the "consequences to the client" of each.28 The lawyer
asks probing questions that will help lawyer and client to more fully under-
stand the consequences for the client. The lawyer converts client statements
into advantages or disadvantages, 29 and the client chooses from the options.
The client-centered counselors' framework claims to be neutral, but in
fact, it steers the client toward a particular method of moral analysis, conse-
quentialism. Decision-making under the client-centered counselor model is
a matter of cost-benefit analysis. The client-centered counselors' framework
excludes the moral imperatives and virtues that are a part of the moral
framework of many. Under some standards of morality, one should do the
right thing in spite of the negative consequences.
In addition, the client-centered counselors' framework steers clients to-
ward making self-serving choices. The client considers only "Consequences
to the Client." This ignores the importance of other people. In the illustra-
tion that one client-centered book gives of its counseling method, a client is
considering suing his neighbor over a zoning violation. Among the "conse-
quences for client" of filing suit are: "Time and effort required," "[m]oney to
pay for fees and expenses," "[e]xposure to deposition and trial examination,"
and "[s]train on relationship with [the neighbor]." 30 The client is to consider
the consequences to the neighbor solely in light of the effect that they will
First, client-centered counselors' moral discourse comes into play only when the lawyer
feels that the client wants to do something that is "morally wrong." Morality (in and out
of the law office) is not generally a matter of choosing whether to do something that is
"morally wrong"; more often it is a choice between something that is better and some-
thing that is worse. It may not be often that the client will make a choice that the lawyer
feels is "morally wrong," but clients constantly are faced with issues that have moral im-
plications. We feel that those moral implications should be considered during the deci-
sion-making process.
SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 1, at 23-24.
Second, the method of moral discourse suggested by the client-centered counselors is
likely to be ineffective. After lawyers encourage the client to see things solely from the
client's perspective and the client makes a decision, it will be difficult for lawyers to shift
gears and reverse the direction of the counseling.
Id. at 24.
27. For a more developed critique of the client-centered counselors, see SHAFFER & COCHRAN,
supra note 1, at 19-24.
28. BINDER & PRICE, supra note 21, at 184; BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 1, at 246-49;
BINDER ET AL, supra note 1, at 307.
29. BINDER & PRICE, supra note 21, at 168.
30. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 1, at 246.
have on the client; the neighbor has no independent moral significance. The
client-centered approach imposes a framework of client selfishness. It may
advance the autonomy of clients, but that autonomy comes at the expense of
the autonomy of other people. It is likely to advance the autonomy of those
who can afford lawyers at the expense of those who cannot.
In some situations, it may be that the client-centered counselors' focus
on client empowerment is justified. Generally, poor people need empower-
ment. In those cases in which the lawyer represents a poor client against a
rich opponent, there is probably little need for the poor client to worry about
the interests of the rich opponent-the rich opponent will likely have plenty
of lawyers to look out for his interests. But when the lawyer represents the
wealthy client against an (often unrepresented) poor party, the lawyer's ex-
clusive focus on client autonomy is likely to result in injustice. If clients
with great power make decisions based solely on "consequences to the cli-
ent" they can cause great harm to others.
C. The Collaborative Approach
The lawyering models discussed thus far each identify one party who
dominates decisions raising moral concerns. Under the directive approach,
the lawyer controls such decisions; under the client-centered approach, the
client controls such decisions (and the lawyer is careful not to influence the
client). Under the collaborative model, the lawyer and client resolve moral
issues together through moral discourse.3' The client makes the ultimate de-
cision, but the lawyer is actively involved in the process. Thomas Shaffer,
who represents the collaborative approach in this symposium, uses the tradi-
tional notion of friendship to describe how a lawyer might raise and discuss
moral issues with clients.3 ' A lawyer should approach moral issues with a
client in the same way that she would approach such issues with a friend,
raising such issues for serious discussion, but not imposing her will on the
client. Other proponents of a collaborative approach to client counseling in-
clude Anthony Kronman, John DiPippa, Martha Peters, and me.33
31. It appears that the first use of the term "collaborative" to describe how a lawyer and client
might resolve issues arising in representation was in JAMES E. MOLITERNO & JOHN M. LEVY,
ETHICS OF TItE LAWYER'S WORK 86 (1993), though their focus was not on the resolution of moral
Issues arising in the representation.
32. See Thomas L. Shaffer, A Lesson From Trollope for Counselors at Law, 35 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 727 (1978); SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note I, at 40-54. The collaborative lawyers' use of
the friendship analogy to describe the lawyer's role in resolving moral issues should be distinguished
from Charles Fried's use of the friendship analogy to explain why a moral lawyer can prefer clients
to other people. Fried's lawyer may be more like a client-centered lawyer, primarily pursuing client
autonomy, though in a portion of his article that has received little attention, he acknowledges that
moral counsel may be a proper role for his lawyer-as-friend. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as
Friend, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1088, 1089 (1976).
33. See, e.g., ANTHONY KRONMAN, TIE LOST LAWYER, (1993) at 131-32; COCHRAN, ET AL.,
supra note 1. Monroe Freedman is one of the leading proponents of client autonomy as the goal of
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Lawyers cannot become friends with every client, but they might dis-
cuss moral issues with clients in the way that they discuss moral issues with
friends. Central to the traditional notion of friendship was a moral compo-
nent: friends help friends become better people. People today generally
think of friendship in terms of pleasure, but the traditional notion of friend-
ship as a moral relationship is not entirely lost. Imagine that a close friend
comes to you and confesses that he has embezzled something from his em-
ployer. You are likely neither to push your friend to confess, nor to ignore
the wrong that your friend has done. You are likely to try and help your
friend think through the matter. You might offer an opinion, but you would
be likely to do so in a tentative fashion, respecting the dignity of your friend.
As Aristotle said, friends collaborate in the good. A friend is unlikely to im-
pose his or her will on a friend, but neither will a friend sit by and let a
friend go down a wrong path.
The lawyer as friend engages in moral conversation with the client but
generally leaves decisions to the client. One of the best ways to raise such
issues is by asking questions that come naturally in the course of decision-
making. As to each alternative under consideration, the lawyer can ask the
client, "what will be its effect on other people?" The lawyer and client
should consider all of the consequences that might arise from various alter-
natives, not merely the consequences to the client. When it comes time to
make a choice among alternatives, the lawyer can ask, "What would be
fair?" Note that this question does not impose the lawyer's values on cli-
ents; it calls on clients to draw on their own sources of moral values.
Anthony Kronman identifies sympathy and detachment as two qualities
that make the counsel of both friends and lawyers valuable.
Friends take each other's interests seriously and wish to see them
advanced; it is part of the meaning of friendship that they do. It does
not follow, however, that friends always accept uncritically each
other's accounts of their own needs. Indeed, friends often exercise a
large degree of independent judgment in assessing each other's in-
terests, and the feeling that one sometimes has an obligation to do
so is also an important part of what the relation of friendship means.
legal representation. In his most recent legal ethics book, he and Abbe Smith adopt the "client-
centered" label for their theory of legal ethics. Nevertheless, on the matter of the lawyer's role
within the counseling relationship, they come down clearly on the side of moral counsel. They rec-
ognize that moral counsel is not inconsistent with client freedom. Moral counsel gives the client the
benefit of the moral resources of the lawyer. See FREEDMAN & HOFFMAN, supra note I at 60-62.
For a more developed critique of Freedman's position, see SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 1, at
24-27.
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What makes such independence possible is the ability of friends to
exercise greater detachment when reflecting on each other's needs
than they are often able to achieve when reflecting on their own. A
friend's independence can be of immense value, and is frequently
the reason why one friend turns to another for advice. Friends of
course expect sympathy from each other: it is the expectation of
sympathy that distinguishes a friend from a stranger. But they also
want detachment, and those who lack either quality are likely to be
poor friends.34
As with the other models of lawyering, there are difficulties with the
collaborative model. To raise and discuss moral problems thoughtfully with
another requires wisdom, a quality that comes in part with age and experi-
ence. It is difficult to combine the sympathy and detachment that is the heart
of good lawyering (it may be that the lawyers for Enron erred too much on
the side of sympathy and were not able to give the dispassionate advice that
their clients needed). In addition, we live in an individualistic age-we do
not collaborate very well. That may be why each of the other models of cli-
ent counseling identifies one of the parties to the relationship as the party in
charge. Moral counsel also requires time, a scarce commodity in the hourly
billing-driven practice of the corporate lawyer or the heavy case-load prac-
tice of the legal aid lawyer.
In addition, differences in power between lawyer and client may make
collaboration difficult. There is a danger that either the lawyer or the client
will dominate the other. In many lawyer/client relationships, the lawyer is in
the dominant position. The lawyer has the knowledge of the law and the
trappings of power. The lawyer sits behind the big desk in the elevated
chair. But in another world of lawyering, the client is likely to be in the po-
sition of power. The lawyer may be little more than an employee of the cor-
porate client. If the lawyer is in-house counsel she is an employee of the
corporate client. The CEO is likely to sit behind the bigger desk, in the
more elevated chair. The power within the relationship can also be a func-
tion of a host of other factors: age, education, experience, sex, social class,
race, and status.35 The lawyer in either situation may have to work to attain
a level of mutuality with the client. She may need to empower the weak cli-
ent; she may need to assert herself with the strong client.36
34. Id. at 131-32.
35. I do not mean to suggest that these factors should affect the power in the relationship or that
one cannot overcome a lack of power, but that lawyers should be aware that these factors may affect
the level of influence that the lawyer will have over a client.
36. The lawyer's natural instincts will, of course, be in the opposite direction. The powerful
lawyer (with weak clients) is likely to feel comfortable asserting power; the weak lawyer (with pow-
erful clients) is likely to be hesitant to raise moral concerns (and may fail to give the independent
advice that the client needs). If the lawyer is to both involve the client in moral discourse and not
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The lawyer may be able to attain mutuality in part by regulating the in-
tensity with which she engages the client in moral discourse. A lawyer can
engage a client over a broad range of intensity levels. That intensity can be
expressed both in the emotions the lawyer displays and the statements she
makes. The lawyer can vary the level of intensity, depending on the client
and the circumstances.3 7 Those circumstances include whether the client has
the ability to go to another lawyer,38 differences in client and lawyer values,
and the power balance between the lawyer and the client. When the deter-
minants of power are primarily on the lawyer's side, the lawyer should be
more hesitant to push during moral discourse. When the determinants are
equal or primarily on the side of the client, the lawyer is unlikely to over-
come the client and can more freely address moral concerns.
A final factor that should influence the level of intensity with which the
lawyer addresses moral concerns is the risk that the representation creates
for other people. If one of the client's options will create danger to other
people, the lawyer should address the moral concerns with greater intensity.
The greater the danger, the greater the intensity. If the lives of other people
are at risk, the most directive moral counsel would be justified. If such
counsel fails, disclosure of confidential information may be justified.39
As can be seen from the above descriptions, each school of client coun-
seling has its strengths. The directive school seeks to implement the law-
yer's perception of the good; the client-centered counselor seeks to protect
the client's autonomy; the collaborative school seeks to work with the client
to identify the good with the client. As noted, each school has its challenges
as well. The articles and discussion which follow seek to address both the
strengths and challenges of each model. Many thanks to those who contrib-
uted to this symposium. It is our hope that the symposium will help to de-
fine what it means for the lawyer to serve as a wise counselor.
overcome the client, she may need to act against her instincts. The powerful lawyer may need to
work to respect the dignity of the weak client; the weak lawyer may need courage to confront the
powerful client.
37. For further discussion of the factors that should cause the lawyer to vary the intensity of
moral discourse and the ways that the lawyer might vary that intensity, see Cochran, Lessons From
Dostoyevsky, supra note 1, at 391-96.
38. In the case of clients who have court-appointed lawyers, such a change may be difficult. See
ABA Model Rules of Prof'i Conduct, MR 1.16(a)(3), (c), and comment 5 (2002).
39. See FREEDMAN & HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 144-47.
II. ETHICS IN COUNSELING
Deborah L. Rhode**
It is a pleasure to be here, or as much of a pleasure as an 8:30 panel on a
Saturday morning can be. This time slot at least insures that we are among
the truly committed; the souls less interested in salvation are still slumbering
or having a civilized breakfast elsewhere. But those of us on the path of
righteousness, thanks to Professor Cochran's diligence, can muse on what
ethics entails at a historical moment when morality is in fashion, not just
among the truly committed, but in the nation generally. This is a boom time
for those of us in the integrity industry: it is not often that the president of
the United States calls for more focus on "right and wrong" in professional
schools. 40 But what right and wrong means in the context of corporate coun-
seling is, of course, much more complicated than most of the post-Enron
commentary acknowledges, so this is a timely occasion to reflect on first
principles.
In the description of this panel, Professor Robert Cochran divided the
counseling jurisprudence into three schools of thought and paid each panelist
here the compliment of having our own school. Under the circumstances, it
seems ungrateful, perhaps even churlish, to quibble with the division, but I
cannot help wondering if the conceptual boundaries are as sharply drawn as
the description implied. I, in the very good company of my coauthor David
Luban and colleague William Simon, am anointed a leader of the "directive"
school, which encompasses lawyers who are "willing to assert control of
moral issues that arise during representation."'4 This approach is contrasted
with the "client-centered" model, which makes the client's own values pre-
eminent, and the "collaborative" model, which invites the client, in consulta-
tion with the attorney, to "draw on his own moral resources" in resolving
ethical questions.42 The distinctive "danger for the directive lawyer is that
she will impose her values on the client. 43
**Deborah L. Rhode is the Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law and Director of the Center on
Ethics at Stanford University.
40. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Announces Tough New Enforcement
Initiatives for Reform, Remarks by the President on Corporate Responsibility, available at
http:www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/print/20020709-4.html (last visited July 12, 2002).
41. Robert Cochran, Legal Ethics, Client Counseling, and Moral Responsibility, Prof. Resp. Sec.,
NEWSLETTER, (Assoc. of Am. L. Sch.), Fall 2002, at 1,2.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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A. Contextual Frameworks
With all respect to a conscientious critic, this does not quite capture my
position. Nor do I think it does justice to Simon's or Luban's views, al-
though I will leave to them the right to clarify their own approaches. The
term I use to describe my own framework in In the Interests of Justice, is not
"directive" but "contextual." In essence, such a framework would require
lawyers to accept personal moral responsibility for the conse-
quences of their professional actions. Attorneys should make deci-
sions as advocates in the same way that morally reflective individu-
als make any ethical decision. Lawyers' conduct should be
justifiable under consistent, disinterested, and generalizable princi-
ples .... [U]nlike the bar's prevailing approach, this alternative
framework would require lawyers to assess their obligations in light
of all the societal interests at issue in particular practice contexts.
Client trust and confidentiality are entitled to weight, but they must
be balanced against other equally important concerns. Lawyers also
have responsibilities to prevent unnecessary harm to third parties, to
promote a just and effective legal system, and to respect core values
such as honesty, fairness, and good faith on which that system de-
pends ... [t]he less confidence that attorneys have in the justice sys-
tem's capacity to deliver justice in a particular case, the greater their
own responsibility to attempt some corrective.
4 4
What that entails in a particular counseling context depends on a range
of factors, such as the significance of the ethical concerns at issue, and the
lawyer's information, responsibility, and capacity to affect outcomes. A
morally justifiable response need not involve imposing values on a client. In
some instances, such as those identified below, a lawyer may find ethical
44. RHODE, supra note 1I, at 66-67 . As I also note,
[1]n accommodating those responsibilities, lawyers should, of course, be guided by rele-
vant legal authority and bar regulatory codes. Respect for law is a fundamental value,
particularly among those sworn to uphold it. Adherence to generally accepted rules also
serves as a check against the decision maker's own bias or self-interest. But... [m]ost
ethical dilemmas arise in areas where the governing standards already leave significant
room for discretion... [W]hether to accept or withdraw from representation, and
whether to pursue certain tactics, [are matters for individual attorneys to decide.] In re-
solving those questions, lawyers need to consider the social context of their choices.
They ... [need to] assess their actions against a realistic backdrop, in which wealth,
power, and information are unequally distributed, not all interests are adequately repre-
sented, and most matters will never reach a neutral tribunal."
Id.
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justifications for deferring to a client's decision despite ethical reservations
about its substance. In other contexts, where lawyers are unwilling to assist
a course of action that they find morally unacceptable, the result will not
necessarily be an imposition of their values. Rather, the lawyer's willing-
ness to take a stance may simply encourage clients to reconsider their posi-
tion, or to accept the financial and psychological consequences of finding
alternative counsel.4a
For purposes of this panel, the key issue is how this contextual approach
converges or parts company with client-centered or collaborative alterna-
tives. That is no small task, particularly since each of these schools encom-
passes commentators who differ in some important respects. But a brief
overview may at least identify concerns that are worth more exploration by
those of us who care about ethics in counseling.
B. Client-Centered Frameworks
What distinguishes client-centered counseling, as the term suggests, is
the priority that it places on client autonomy. 6 This approach has much to
recommend it, particularly in the clinical settings in which its adherents have
been most influential. At its most fundamental level, the lawyer-client rela-
tionship is one of agency, and it makes sense to defer to the values of those
who generally are directing or paying for the representation and will have to
live with its results.
A framework that promotes clients' interests is especially justifiable
where clients are relatively disempowered and protecting their rights has
value independent of the merits of their particular claims. So, for example,
deferring to a criminal defendant's desire for a trial, even where the lawyer
believes that the client is guilty and that a trial would be costly for all con-
cerned, can be ethically justified on systemic grounds. As I argue in In the
Interests of Justice, society's commitment to due process and individual
rights depends on a justice system that guarantees effective representation to
all whose life, liberty, and reputation are at risk. 7 Without counsel willing
to pursue defendants' interests as they perceive them and to challenge the
government's case, law enforcement officials would have inadequate incen-
tives to respect constitutional rights or to investigate the facts thoroughly.
Insuring client-centered representation for defendants who are guilty is cru-
cial to protecting those who are not.48 So too, some civil cases raise analo-
45. Id. at 57-58.
46. BINDER ET AL., sutpra note I, at 17; BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 1, at 26-27; BINDER
& PRICE, supra note 2 1, at 147-48; Robert M. Bastress, Client-Centered Counseling and Moral Ac-
countabilityfor Lawyers, 10 J. LEGAL PROF. 97, 99 (1985).
47. RHODE, supra note 1I, at 54-55.
48. Id.
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gous concerns of protecting individual rights and preventing abuses of gov-
ernmental power. For example a lawyer may be ethically justified in de-
fending the free speech rights of white supremacist organizations, even
while profoundly disagreeing with the moral content of their message.49
Despite these strengths, a client-centered approach is limited in several
key respects. As a descriptive matter, it does not accurately reflect the role
that ethical values in fact play in counseling relationships. And as a norma-
tive matter, it does not capture the role that values should play, in order to
serve both client and societal interests.
In describing counseling relationships, most client-centered commentary
assumes that clients seek legal assistance to pursue interests that are
autonomously determined and that lawyers' basic responsibility is to provide
11 50
"neutral," "nonjudgmental" assistance. Yet, as many commentators have
noted, including some from client-centered as well as collaborative and con-
textual schools, this approach is both "unworkable and implausible.' The
way that lawyers present information cannot help but shape clients' concep-
tions of their own goals and interests.
A well-known example comes from Professor William Simon's years in
practice.52 The client, Mrs. Jones, was an elderly black woman accused of
leaving the scene of a minor traffic accident without identifying herself. She
denied having done so and claimed that the other driver, who was white, had
caused the accident and had left without stopping. Based solely on the white
driver's uncorroborated claims, the state charged Mrs. Jones with a misde-
meanor carrying a maximum six-month sentence. The case was weak and
involved significant evidence of racial bias by law enforcement officials.
Recognizing as much, the prosecution offered a plea of nolo contendre and
probation. Mrs. Jones asked what Simon thought that she should do. True
to the client-centered approach, Simon declined to make a recommendation
because the "decision was hers. 53 Rather, he described the pros and cons of
a plea bargain and concluded "if you took their offer there probably
49. See id. at 74-76.
50. BINDER & PRICE, supra note 21, at 166; BINDER ET AL., supra note 1, at 288; BASTRESS &
HARBAUGH, supra note 1, at 57; Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 717,
733-79 (1987).
51. William Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Counseling, ETHICS AND PRACTICE 165, 172
(Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000). See also SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note I, at 23-24; Ellmann,
supra note 50, at 761-75; Stephen Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assistance and Cli-
ent-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 908 (1988). For a general critique of the early coun-
seling literature see William H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32
STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980).
52. Simon, supra note 51.
53. Id. at 167.
wouldn't be any bad practical consequences but it wouldn't be total jus-
tice. ' '54 Mrs. Jones and a minister who had accompanied her, responded in
unison, "[w]e want justice.""
Simon reported this decision to an experienced practitioner whom he
had enlisted as co-counsel. It was a pro bono matter and Simon had never
handled a criminal case before, so he wanted assistance from a more sea-
soned practitioner. He got it. This lawyer engaged in his own version of cli-
ent-centered counseling. He, too, refrained from saying what he thought
Mrs. Jones should do, but ended by describing at somewhat greater length
the very remote possibility of a jail sentence if she lost at trial. He did not
mention justice. She accepted the plea.
In retrospect, Simon believes that he did his client a disservice, particu-
larly in light of psychological evidence indicating that people tend to over-
value risks that have a very low probability of occurring but highly adverse
consequences if they do. 6 A fuller discussion in which Simon aired his own
views about the value of exposing racist practices might have empowered
the client to make a different decision, one that would have better expressed
her highest values. 7 In any case, the primary moral of the story is how dif-
ficult it is to banish morals entirely. Lawyers' own values often uncon-
sciously shape their assessments and presentations of relevant choices. And
those presentations inescapably shape clients' understandings of their own
interests and values. The full autonomy and neutrality that are central to cli-
ent-centered theory are not realizable in practice; nor should they be.
A second limitation of client-centered approaches is the extent to which
they promote client self-interest at the expense of other values. As moral
philosophers including David Luban have noted, individual autonomy does
not have intrinsic value; its importance derives from the values it fosters,
such as personal creativity, initiative, and responsibility. 8 If a particular cli-
ent objective does not, in fact, promote those values, or does so only at much
greater cost to third parties, then deference to that objective is not ethically
justifiable. 5
Lawyers manage to avoid this conclusion only by selectively suspending
the moral principle they claim to respect. Under client-centered approaches,
the legal rights and personal autonomy of clients assume paramount con-
cern; the rights and autonomy of third parties play only a walk-on role.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 168-72. For the psychological evidence see PAUL SLOVIC, STANLEY FISCHHOFF, &
SARAH LICHTENSTEIN, Facts versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 493-518 (Daniel Kahnemann et al. eds., 1982).
57. Simon, supra note 13, at 174.
58. David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 637, 639 (1986).
59. Luban, supra note 12; RHODE, supra note 11, at 57-59.
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There is, to be sure, some difference in how commentators view that role
and how much scope they give to lawyers' own ethical assessments of socie-
tal and third party interests. According to some commentators, lawyers
should raise considerations that implicate clients' values, but should refrain
from introducing their own values. 60 Unless a client's decision "violates the
law or is clearly immoral, principles of client autonomy suggest that client
values prevail.' Other commentators take a stance closer to my own con-
textual approach; a lawyer is entitled to raise moral objections, and if they
are serious and incompatible with the client's objectives, the lawyer should
refuse to proceed.62
From an ethical standpoint, the more restrictive view of the lawyer's
role is hard to justify even on its own terms. If clients' autonomy is the pre-
eminent value, why shouldn't their interests always take priority unless they
are illegal or clearly immoral, a circumstance that lawyers rarely report en-
countering in practice? In the only systematic survey to date, only two per-
cent of sampled lawyers recalled giving advice regarding the "public inter-
est" and seventy-five percent claimed never to have encountered a serious
ethical conflict with any client during their entire career.63
Of course, as a practical matter, lawyers' reluctance to challenge clients'
self-interest makes perfect sense. These individuals are, after all, generally
footing the bill for the lawyers' services. But from a moral standpoint, the
priority on client autonomy is impossible to justify, particularly when the
client is an organization. A corporation's "right" to maximize profits
through unsafe or misleading but imperfectly regulated methods, can hardly
take ethical precedence over other individuals' right to be free from reasona-
bly avoidable risks. Client-centered representation has led to lawyers' com-
plicity in some of the most socially costly enterprises in recent memory: the
distribution of asbestos and dalkon shields; the suppression of health infor-
mation about cigarettes; and the financially irresponsible ventures of savings
and loan associations and corporations such as Enron.64
60. BINDER & PRICE, supra note 21, at 9; BINDER ET AL., supra note 1, at 8, 28, n.49. See
SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 1, at 19-23.
61. BINDER ET AL., supra note 1, at 280, 282.
62. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 1, at 334-35.
63. Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client
Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 533 (1985).
64. See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL,
(1985); SUSAN PERRY AND JIM DAWSON, NIGHTMARE: WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD 208
(1985); David Margolick, Tobacco Its Middle Name, Law Firm Thrives, For Now, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
20, 1992, at Al; Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.C. 1990); Deborah L.
Rhode & Paul Patton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J. LAW & BUS 9 (2002).
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As officers of the court and gatekeepers in imperfect regulatory proc-
esses, lawyers have obligations that transcend those owed to any particular
client.65 Honesty, trust, and fairness are collective goods; neither legal nor
market systems can function effectively if lawyers lack a basic sense of so-
cial responsibility for the consequences of their professional acts. To the ex-
tent that lawyers were implicated in the recent moral meltdowns, the prob-
lem was too much client-centered representation, not too little.66
A related problem with client-centered approaches is that they socialize
lawyers to a restrictive role that often ill serves even client interests. Survey
evidence suggests that lawyers significantly underestimate the extent to
which clients would welcome non-legal advice. 67 Even where they do not,
they might ultimately benefit from it, even in contexts where their decision
is not clearly immoral or illegal. As Elihu Root famously put it, "[a]bout
half the practice of a decent lawyer consists in telling would-be clients that
they are damn fools and should stop.
' 68
The need for such counseling is greatest when a client's judgment is im-
paired. The impairment may spring from multiple causes: youth, mental
health difficulties, peer pressures, economic constraints, or psychological
traumas such as divorce.69 Under such circumstances, individuals may be
poorly situated to take a longterm view of their interests or live up to their
own moral values.
A variety of cognitive biases often prevent even seemingly rational
business clients from accurately assessing facts that are economically incon-
venient to acknowledge. Donald Langevoort and Richard Painter have ex-
tensively documented the ways that situational influences and psychological
predispositions converge to lead corporate management to overlook or ra-
tionalize unsafe and fraudulent activity. 70 For example, short-term profit in-
centives often tempt decisionmakers to discount less quantifiable considera-
tions such as public reaction and the risks of detection.7' Once managers
65. RHODE, supra note II, at 65-66; Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can't Just Be Hired
Guns, ETHICS AND PRACTICE 42 - 54 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000); Robert W. Gordon, Corporate
Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255 (1990).
66. Rhode & Patton, supra note 64.
67. Edward A. Davies, Attorneys Underestimate Clients Desire for Business Involvement, Survey
Shows, PREVENTIVE L. REP., Dec. 1988, at 15.
68. PHILIP C. JESSUP, I ELIHU ROOT 133 (1930).
69. See sources cited in DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 424-27, 592-615
(3d ed. 2000).
70. Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemological Dilemma of the Corporate-Securities Lawyer:
Beliefs, Biases, and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629 (1997); Donald C.
Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers' Responsibility for Cli-
ents'Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75 (1993); Richard W. Painter, Irrationality and Cognitive Bias at a
Closing in Arthur Solmssen s The Comfort Letter, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1111 (2000).
71. Langevoort, The Epistemological Dilemma, supra note 70, at 668-669; Messick &
Braverman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of Decision Making, SLOAN MGT. REV., winter
1996, at 10- I1.
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have committed to particular projects, they are often inclined to construe
events in ways that confirm prior beliefs and to adhere to such commitments
in the face of countervailing evidence.72 Such "cognitive conservatism" may
blind decision-makers to evidence of deception or adverse social conse-
quences.73 Group decision-making processes can compound the problem.
Diffusion of responsibility and fears (often justifiable) of alienating col-
leagues may work to suppress unwelcome information.74 As subsequent
discussion indicates, lawyers, no less than clients, are subject to such cogni-
tive biases. A definition of professional role that encourages deference to
clients' current preference may poorly serve their ultimate interests.
A similar problem arises when clients are entities that can only speak
through agents with competing concerns. Managers' desires to maximize
their own income, power, or status within an organization may encourage
decisions that are not in the broader interest of other stakeholders. Since
lawyers' ethical responsibilities run to the entity, and not to any particular
constituent, their counseling responsibilities need to take account of such
conflicting concerns. 75 Yet most client-centered commentary ignores these
responsibilities, and assumes a kind of dyadic counseling relationship that is
out of touch with organizational complexities. Under these circumstances,
as Robert Gordon notes, lawyers can readily become "cheerful abettors" of
corporate abuses.76
72. Langevoort, The Epistemological Dilemma, supra note 70, at 642; Donald C. Langevoort,
Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors
(and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 142-43; Painter, supra note 70, at 1132;
Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action, 6 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 577
(1981); Ramona et al., Escalating Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Separating the Roles
of Choice and Justification, 79 J. APP. PSYCH. 360 (1994).
73. Langevoort, Organized Illusions supra note 72, at 135-39; Painter, supra note 72, at 1131;
Langevoort, The Epistemological Dilemma, supra note 70, at 641-42; SUSAN T. FISK & SHELLEY E.
TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION, 149-51 (2d ed. 1991); NISBETr & ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE:
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 167 (1981).
74. CHRIS ARGYS, OVERCOMING ORGANIZATIONAL DEFENSES: FACILITATING
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING (1990); 1 JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOS (1972); ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL
COGNITIVE THEORY OF MORAL THOUGHT AND ACTION, IN I HANDBOOK OF MORAL BEHAVIOR AND
ACTION 45, 84-86 (Kurtines & Gewirtz eds., 1991); Langevoort, The Epistemological Dilemma,
supra note 70, at 637, 640, 651-52; Deborah L. Rhode, If Integrity is the Answer, What is the Ques-
tion?, FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming).
75. See ABA Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility, MR 1.13 (2002).
76. Robert W. Gordon, A Collective Failure of Nerve: The Bar's Response to Kay Scholer, 23
LAW& SOC. INQUIRY 315,316 (1998).
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C. Collaborative Frameworks
Collaborative frameworks offer many of the same strengths as client-
centered approaches while at least partly compensating for some of their ma-
jor limitations. As the term suggests, collaborative counseling envisions
lawyers and clients as co-venturers in problem solving and jointly responsi-
ble for its ethical implications. The advantages of this approach stem from
its protection of individual liberty and autonomy, and its checks on paternal-
istic or domineering lawyer intervention. The client's preferred course of
action prevails unless the attorney finds it "morally wrong. 77 Yet collabora-
tive frameworks also envision a broader scope than client-centered para-
digms for lawyers' own values, including concerns for societal and third
party interests. Collaborative counseling treats the lawyer-client relationship
like one of friendship, and urges participants to cultivate virtues central to
moral discourse, such as "compassion, tolerance, humility, courage, honesty,
care, and persistence., 78 Unlike client-centered models, collaborative ap-
proaches dispel the illusion that "neutrality" is possible or desirable. 79
Rather, they recognize that one of a lawyer's most valuable contributions is
to engage and enlarge their client's moral vision, and to encourage decisions
that express parties' highest principles.
A promising extension of this approach is reflected in a branch of family
law practice that has claimed the same term. These "collaborative lawyers"
offer a more cooperative form of dispute resolution than traditional client-
centered adversarial processes.8 0 Under their approach, parties commit to
collaborate with each other as well as with their lawyers in an attempt at mu-
tual problem solving. Each client is represented by counsel, and signs a re-
tainer agreement providing that the lawyer is to assist them in reaching a
fair, out-of-court agreement. If the parties fail to reach such a settlement, the
lawyers may not represent them in further proceedings. The clients also
commit to act in good faith and to disclose all relevant information. 81 This
dispute resolution process involves joint settlement meetings with parties
and their lawyers, all of whom have a substantial stake in maintaining coop-
erative relationships and engaging in creative, mutually beneficial problem
solving.
This approach is not, of course, practical for all dispute resolution set-
tings. Nor is it a substitute for the morally engaged dialogue that the term
collaborative counseling originally implied. By definition, parties who are
77. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 1, at 51.
78. Id. at 54.
79. Id. at 27.
80. See Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: What It Is and Why Family Law Attorneys Need to
Know About It, 13 AM. J. FAM. LAW 215 (1999); Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: A New
Paradigm for Divorce Lawyers, 5 Psych. Pub. Pol'y & Law 967 (1999).
81. Tesler, Collaborative Law: What it is, supra note 80, at 220-21.
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most in need of ethical advice are probably among those least likely to
commit to fair and cooperative problem solving. Such a dispute resolution
process also cannot compensate for inequities in substantive law, gross ine-
qualities in power, or the absence of representation for third parties like chil-
dren whose welfare is directly implicated.82
A still more fundamental limitation, one shared by other collaborative
approaches, is the risk that lawyers will too closely identify with clients' in-
terests, at least where it is financially advantageous to do so. The recent
spate of corporate scandals offers ample case studies of what happens when
the "inner resources" of corporate managers prove inadequate to the occa-
sion, and their lawyers are unable to notice. Seldom was the conduct so un-
ambiguously illegal or immoral that counsel were unable to rationalize their
assistance. Vinson & Elkins, the law firm representing Enron, managed to
find their highly misleading accounting strategies "creative and aggressive,"
not deceptive or fraudulent.83 Collaborative approaches invite lawyers to
empathize with clients - to walk in their shoes. 84 However, as research on
organizational misconduct amply demonstrates, what is generally needed
from lawyers is less empathetic identification and more independent judg-
ment.85 Yet the counseling literature is all too silent about the socioeco-
nomic constraints that get in the way.
D. Contextual Frameworks Revisited: The Need for Structural Analysis
A final limitation of both collaborative and client-centered approaches
to counseling is the lack of attention to its structural foundations. The ro-
manticized portrait of lawyers as friends obscures the financial dimensions
of professional relationships. Yet economic considerations are a large part
of what has encouraged excessive deference to clients who can afford it, and
82. Penelope Eileen Bryan, Collaborative Divorce: Meaningful Reform or Anther Quick Fix?, 5
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & LAW 1001 (1999); Pauline H. Tesler, The Believing Game, the Doubting
Game, and Collaborative Law: A Reply to Penelope Bryan, 5 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & LAW 1018
(1999).
83. Patti Waldmeir, Inside Track-A Failure to Squeal, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2002, (quoting Vin-
son & Elkins memorandum). For discussion of the misleading nature of Enron's conduct, see
sources cited in Rhode & Patton, supra note 64; William C. Powers, Report of Investigation by the
Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp., Feb. 1, 2002. For a simi-
lar example, see Mitchell Pacelle, As Firm Implodes, Lawyer's Advice Is Point of Contention, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 29, 2002, at Al, A16.
84. Thomas L. Shaffer, Christian Theories of Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L. REV.
721, 728 (1975); SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 1, at 131.
85. See Langevoort, The Epistemological Dilemma, supra note 70, at 654-56; 666-67; 676;
Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?, supra note 70, at 635; Painter, supra note 70, at 1131, 1137.
inadequate representation for those who cannot. The "lawyer-as-friend"
analogy discretely overlooks an obvious distinction: the lawyer becomes the
client's friend only for money, which is the classic definition of a very par-
ticular type of friendship, an occupation with which law has often been un-
charitably linked.86 But when money is absent, so also are many professional
friends.
That point is scarcely lost on the general public. Lawyer humor collec-
tions often include variations on the friendship analogies embraced in coun-
seling commentary. But in satirists' rendition, the metaphor has a pragmatic
cast. Lawyers are advised that "[b]efore you judge your client, walk a mile
in his shoes. Then, when you get around to judgment, you'll be a mile away
and you can keep his shoes." Just as life imitates art, law imitates parody. To
take only the most recent example, many lawyers connected with Enron
were happy to suspend judgment until the organization imploded. Then they
shared the shoes. In the first four months after the company declared bank-
ruptcy, a dozen firms reportedly pocketed nearly $64 million in fees and ex-
penses.87
In short, lawyers' counseling role is influenced by interests as well as
values. The legal profession is by no means exempt from the natural human
tendency to adjust beliefs in expedient directions. Self-serving biases inevi-
tably affect the way lawyers see the world and assess their clients' options. 88
For example, in Robert Granfield and Thomas Koenig's recent survey of
ethical decision making in legal practice, many attorneys acknowledged
shifting or suspending judgment in the course of representing clients. 89
Some lawyers, whose initial sympathies ran to victims in medical malprac-
tice or environmental hazard cases, ultimately came to identify with their
clients on the other side.90 Other practitioners put their principles on hold.
As one survey participant reported: "I used to care about how the things I
did as a lawyer affected people, but I don't find myself asking these ques-
tions anymore."9' So too, it is scarcely coincidental that Vinson & Elkins'
admiration for Enron's "creative" accounting methods involved a client that
had accounted for more than seven percent of the firm's annual revenue, and
had employed some twenty of the finn's former lawyers.92
86. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics,
1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29, 108-09 (1978). See also RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 69.
87. Lisa Stansky, Enron Fees: $64 Million-So Far, NATIONAL L. J., July 8, 2002, at Al, A12.
88. For discussion of how lawyers' cognitive biases implicate them in unethical conduct, see
LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER supra note 12, at 95; Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?, supra
note 70, at 75.
89. Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, "It's Hard to be a Human Being and a Lawyer ": Young
Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice, (forthcoming).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Mike France, One Big Client, One Big Hassle, Bus. Week On line, Jan. 28, 2002, available at
http://www.businessweek.coin:/print/magazine/content/02-04/b3767706.htm?mainwindow (last
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By contrast, client allegiance is noticeably weaker where financial con-
siderations run in the opposite direction. In the vast majority of cases in-
volving indigents, crushing caseloads and ludicrously low statutory fees
make effective counseling an unaffordable luxury.9 3 Related problems arise
in contexts where client resources or financial stakes are too limited to un-
derwrite effective representation or where such representation will antago-
nize individuals whose support is critical to lawyers' self-interest. For ex-
ample, studies of attorneys working in small towns or handling small
consumer claims find that these practitioners frequently curtail their repre-
sentation.94 Over the long run, they are reluctant to provoke ill will among
opponents likely to supply or refer future work. Similar difficulties emerge
with other particularly vulnerable clients. Research on legal aid programs
and divorce cases finds that many individual needs are inadequately met. 9'
"Cooling the client out" is a common technique; parties' expectations are
revised downward to accommodate overworked or under-compensated at-
torneys.96
So, to borrow Lenin's unfashionable phrase, "[w]hat is to be done?"
Here the counseling literature is helpful to a point, but falls considerably
short. It directs primary attention to training, and calls on law schools to of-
fer better instruction in counseling skills. 97 This is surely right as far as it
goes. In In the Interests of Justice, I fault legal education for treating skills
education as a poor relation, and for failing to prepare students for the inter-
personal dimensions of legal practice. 98 The current curriculum is equally
visited July 29, 2002); John Schwartz, Questions from Congress for Enron s Law Firm, N.Y. TIMES,
March 12, 2002, at C1.
93. See RHODE, supra note 11, at 61-63; DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE; RACE AND CLASS IN
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 83 (1995). Most court-appointed counsel do not have
sufficient resources to hire the experts and investigators who may be essential to an adequate de-
fense. Catherine Greene Burnett, Michael K. Moore, & Allan K. Butcher, In Pursuit of Independent,
Qualified, and Effective Counsel: The Past and Future of Indigent Criminal Defense in Texas, 42 S.
TEX. L. REV. 595, 597, 622, 641 (2001); No Fair Trial Unless You Can Buy One, ATLANTA-J.
CONSTITUTION, Sep. 9, 2001, at D8
94. DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY LAWYERS: THE IMPACT OF CONTEXT ON PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICE 136, 142 (1990); Richard Abel, Revisioning Lawyers, in RICHARD ABEL AND PHILIP
LEWIS, LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: AN OVERVIEW 6 (1995); Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer
Protection, 14 LAW& SOC'Y REV. 115, 136-141 (1979).
95. AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS (1995);
KAREN WINNER, DIVORCED FROM JUSTICE, (1996); Paul E. Lee & Mary M. Lee, Reflections from
the Bottom of the Well: Racial Bias in the Provision of Legal Services to the Poor, 27
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 311 (1993).
96. Abraham Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation
of a Profession, I LAW AND SOC'Y REV. 15 (1967).
97. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 1, at 49.
98. Rhode, supra note II, at 198-99.
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inattentive to the organizational, psychological, and financial pressures that
work against effective counseling relationships. If, as ample research sug-
gests, many lawyers talk past concerns that are most crucial to their clients,
and fail to raise significant ethical issues, then we, as educators, are partly
responsible-but only partly.99
Much of the problem lies deeper, and involves the structural constraints
and cognitive biases noted earlier. None is easily altered. Moreover, a re-
lated bias involves individuals' natural tendencies to overstate the impor-
tance of personal flaws and undervalue the role of situational influences in
explaining ethical lapses.'00 It is less threatening to blame individual devi-
ance than institutional pressures that could affect us all. But it is also less
productive. The massive misconduct revealed in Enron et al. involved fail-
ures of counseling, but the solution is not simply better counseling educa-
tion. Changes are needed in regulatory structures and reward systems.'0 '
Lawyers, managers, accountants, and those who oversee them all must be
subject to greater accountability.
A timely reminder is captured in one of the New Yorker's collection of
business cartoons. It features a corporate boardroom filled with well-heeled
executives, presumably including legal counsel, and a meeting chair who
announces, "this might not be ethical. Is that a problem for anyone?"
As teachers and scholars of professional responsibility, our aim should
be to ensure that if our former students are in that room, someone has a
problem. And we should also help ensure that if no one does, adequate
regulatory structures are in place to hold them accountable later. More ethi-
cally sensitive counseling is part of the answer. But we also need greater at-
tention to the institutional structures and professional self-interests that get
in the way.
99. See Granfield & Koenig, supra note 89 at 39; Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients: Putting
Professional Service on the Agenda of Legal Education, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 43, 44, 53 (1991);.
100. LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 87-89, 140-41 (1991); Fiske & Taylor, supra note 74, at 72-75; KELLY G.
SHAVER, THE ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME: CAUSALITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND BLAMEWORTHINESS
132-36 (1985); Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?, supra note 71, at 108.
101. For reform proposals, see Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers, supra note 70, at 113;
Rhode & Patton, supra note 64.
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III. CLIENT-CENTERED COUNSELING AND MORAL ACTIVISM
Paul R. Tremblay***
I am delighted to be here this morning to talk about client counseling
and moral responsibility, a topic which intrigues me a great deal, as I am
sure it intrigues you. I am even happier to be able to share a panel with three
people whose work I have admired for so long. The challenge for us to con-
sider today, and for the profession generally, is to develop a workable and
ethical role for lawyers who confront injustice, corruption and unjustified
harm to others in their practices. My role here is to represent the "client-
centered" approach to counseling, in contrast to the alternative perspectives
of Professors Rhode and Shaffer. I am happy to do that, but in doing so I
note the challenge of that particular responsibility. For many, there is a short
leap between client-centeredness and "hired gun," and once we are there, I
am expected then to shill for the lawyers for Enron, for WorldCom, for
Tyco, and all the other corporate scalawags. I confess that I am not sure if I
am really up for that kind of shilling this morning. In a sense, though, I will
offer a guarded defense, in the end, of what those lawyers do and of their
behaviors, but perhaps not in the way that you might expect.
Allow me to present a brief preview of my ideas. I will start by defend-
ing the idea of client-centeredness in what I will call its "instrumental" use.
But accepting the role of neutrality of the lawyer in that setting does not, it
seems to me, require the same neutrality when questions arise about what is
good, or what is right. I am an adherent, or at least I have some interest in,
this idea of casuistry,' °2 and I am persuaded by the casuists that lawyers can
have reasoned discussions about right and wrong, as those discussions tend
to turn more on questions of fact than on questions of value. This all sounds
pretty promising so far, until we realize that lawyers are subject to some
powerful, persistent, and stubborn heuristics and biases that cause them to
believe and to know what they want, or what their interests want them, to
believe in. And to work as a moral activist, as I understand the message of
the adherents of that stance, a lawyer must have considerable certainty about
*** Clinical Professor, Boston College Law School. This essay represents a slightly different ver-
sion of my remarks at the Annual Meeting of Association of American Law Schools, the Section on
Professional Responsibility, January 4, 2003. Because of the early Saturday morning time for this
panel, I opted to leave out all footnote references during my talk at the Annual Meeting. I thank F.
Miguel Flores, Boston College Law School Class of 2004, for able research assistance.
102. See Paul R. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 489, 498-503 (1999).
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the injustice to which activism responds. My sense is that such certainty is
far less often attainable than we otherwise expect. That realization, in turn,
leaves the activism stance in a rather frustrating place.
Let me start then with the client-centered conception. As a baseline ori-
entation for counseling, it seems to make a lot of sense. The Binder, Berg-
man and Price book, 10 3 whose second edition I have been working on, pio-
neered the idea of client-centeredness as the best way to avoid
misunderstanding or interfering with a client's autonomous choices. 0 4 The
counseling method designed by Binder, Bergman and Price is rather ele-
gant. 1 5 It recognizes that instrumental decisions-for instance, whether to
settle, what terms belong in a deal, the choice of strategy, and the like-turn
on considerations of risk aversion, weighing harms and benefits, psychologi-
cal comforts and so forth. There are no analytically correct solutions in
those instrumental counseling contexts, and lawyers have no special exper-
tise on the questions that really matter.'0 6 The model, therefore, encourages
neutrality on the part of the lawyer and respect for the preferences of the cli-
ent. I deliberately avoid use of the term "values" when we talk about those
preferences, because I intend, in a moment, to distinguish between an indi-
vidual's values and her preferences. The client-centered counseling model
urges neutrality, lest the lawyers' preferences seep in and influence the
choices to be made. That, according to the model, would be wrong, and
would be a bad thing, because there is really no reason why the lawyer's
preferences should matter on those scores.
Now, if we agree with that analysis, then the question becomes, should
the same neutrality apply when questions of what is good, or right, arise? If
we oppose a lawyer influencing a client on instrumental matters, one might
think that it follows that we would equally oppose a lawyer influencing a
client on questions of values. I argue that such a conclusion does not follow.
Here's the problem with assuming that neutrality about tactics and decision
making requires neutrality about values. The client-centered model's com-
mitment to neutrality is premised on the lawyer's lack of any real expertise
about what is most important to the client. But there is no analogous reason,
with one important exception, to assume that the lawyer lacks expertise
about harm that the client's scheme might cause to innocent folks, to the
widows and orphans, or to the small investors and the like.
103. BINDER, BERGMAN & PRICE, supra note I.
104. In truth, the earlier iteration of that text better deserves the credit for pioneering the client-
centered lawyering model. See BINDER & PRICE, supra note 2 1. For other early path-breaking work
on the underpinnings of client-centeredness see DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT:
WHO'S IN CHARGE (1974); Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent
and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 50 (1979).
105. See BINDER, BERGMAN & PRICE, supra note I, at 16-24, 287-308.
106. See Ellmann, supra note 5 1, at 717; Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Re-
appraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501(1990).
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The client's personal preferences and risk aversion are truly peculiar to
the client. The lawyer might be very, very good at learning what is most
important to that client, but she literally can never know it as well as the cli-
ent can (absent some evidence that the client is succumbing to distorting bi-
ases).'O7 But harm to third persons, and questions of justice, are not personal
to the client at all. Both the lawyer and the client, and perhaps the lawyer
more expertly than the client, can observe and predict pain, harm, uncon-
scionability, and injustice. So the call for neutrality on questions of the good
is not a by-product of a client-centered approach.
1 know, as well as you perhaps, that the dividing line between what is
instrumental and tactical, on the one hand, and what is unjust or morally
troublesome, on the other, is not as clear as my discussion gives it credit for.
But let me elide that problem for a moment, because I want to use my scarce
time here to think out loud about where we are left if we agree that the law-
yer ought to recognize, and influence her client about, sleaze or injustice or
nastiness.
Now, some might say, as in fact some have said,'0 8 that the non-
neutrality that I have just described tolerates and even encourages lawyers to
"impose values" on a client. A genuine worry surfaces frequently about
lawyers imposing their values on clients, and I find that worry to be an odd
thing. It implies, rather directly it seems, that values are somehow personal
or idiosyncratic or ungrounded. Consider the following: as a lawyer I hap-
pen to believe that enriching executives, and their lawyers, at the expense of
investors and employees who themselves were misled and tricked by those
very executives and lawyers, is a bad thing. If I urge that on you, are we
worried that perhaps your value system tends to hold that state of affairs to
be good, and that my conception of injustice will be imposed unfairly on
yours? This idea of "imposing values" is essentially a relativist, or perhaps
subjectivist idea. 109 As Bradley Wendel"O and others"'. have written within
107. See text accompanying notes 133-45 infra.
108. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHIcS 7
(2d ed. 2002); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617 (1986),](worrying that a moral activist
stance leads to moral decisions imposed by "an oligarchy of lawyers"). The idea that values may be
"imposed" is a variation on the widely accepted notion that values may be (and perhaps ought to be)
"inculcated." See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today?
Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
62, 69 (2002) ("[v]alues inculcation is an inherent by-product of the educational process, and it
would be absurd to hypothesize a vibrant democratic society absent such a process").
109. For a development of this idea at greater length, see Paul R. Tremblay, Shared Norms, Bad
Lawyers, and the Virtues of Casuistry, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 659, 695-704 (2002);W. Bradley Wendel,
Ethics for Skeptics, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 165, 167-75 (2002).
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the tradition of casuistry, we just do not run our lives that way. We do not
treat values as though they were that idiosyncratic. Imagine for a moment
how relativist or idiosyncratic you think value judgments are the next time
some jerk cuts in front of you in a long line for World Series tickets. Maybe
you cannot prove that the jerk is wrong, but the folks in line with you would
show him, and in no uncertain terms, that they know he's wrong. (Now I am
from Boston, so for me this example is just a thought experiment, but you
understand the basic point.)
So the message from the casuists is that we tend to have common,
shared sentiments about the good, and we can reason about that ideal. But if
we accept that assumption, we are a bit puzzled, because our world is all too
cluttered with moral and political controversies that seem to resist this kind
of shared, consensus-based reasoning.' 12 Who could possibly disagree that
we argue about all kinds of moral and political issues? Certainly not I.
People disagree all the time about just about every important moral and
political issue. But when you parse out their disagreement, it is almost in-
variably about facts, not about values as such." 3 People who debate com-
plex issues rely on arguments that are grounded in assertions about what will
happen, what has happened, or what accounts for what has happened. You
oppose welfare expansion, and support strict workfare, because you believe
that welfare recipients are lazy, and need incentives to find work." 14 I sup-
port welfare expansion, and oppose strict workfare, because I believe that
welfare recipients are oppressed, discriminated against, and need the money
to survive and to raise their children." 15 You never argue that welfare recipi-
110. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Teaching Ethics in an Atmosphere of Skepticism and Relativ-
ism, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 711,734 (2002).
1I1. The idea that values are not idiosyncratic, but are shared and represented by paradigm cases,
is a central tenet of casuistry. For a review of the leading casuist literature, see for example, HUGO
ADAM BEDAU, MAKING MORTAL CHOICES: THREE EXERCISES IN MORAL CASUISTRY (1997);
ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF MORAL
REASONING (1988); MARK G. KUCZEWSKI, FRAGMENTATION AND CONSENSUS: COMMUNITARIAN
AND CASUIST BIOETHICS 81 (1997); Carson Strong, Justification in Ethics, MORAL THEORY AND
MORAL JUDGMENTS 193 (Baruch A. Brody ed., 1988). See also AARON LEONARD MACKLER, CASES
AND JUDGMENTS IN ETHICAL REASONING: AN APPRAISAL OF CONTEMPORARY CASUISTRY AND
HOLISTIC MODELS FOR THE MUTUAL SUPPORT OF NORMS AND CASE JUDGMENTS (1992) (unpub-
lished draft, on file with the author). The casuists' notion of shared norms is similar to the moral
philosophers' arguments supporting an objective view of morality. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, THE
LAST WORD (1997);Ronald Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1718 (1998);
Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996).
112. The common reference to "culture wars" is a ready example of the kinds of deep disagree-
ment to which I refer here. See, e.g., JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO
DEFINE AMERICA (1992).
113. See Tremblay, Shared Norms, supra note 110, at 661.
114. See, e.g., Brian M. Riedl & Robert E. Rector, Myths and Facts: Why Successful Welfare Re-
form Must Strengthen Work Requirements, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER No. 1568
(July 12, 2002); John Engler, The Liberal Rout: Why Conservatives are Winning in the 1990s, 81
POL'Y REV. (January-February 1997).
115. See, e.g., Mark Neal Aaronson, Scapegoating the Poor: Welfare Reform All Over Again and
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ents who really will die without the money should die. I never argue that
lazy people should get money so they can sit home and buy vodka. Our val-
ues are not so different. Our views of the facts, though, are terrifically dif-
ferent.
Most current political debate fits this scheme. Consider this: as the
Bush administration repeatedly and persistently relaxes the environmental
regulations that were implemented in the Clinton administration, the Bush
administration and the corporate lobbyists defend their positions by claiming
that the relaxed regulations will in fact, in the long run, lead to cleaner air
and cleaner water." 16 They do not defend their policies by arguing that more
pollution is good. They use arguments, grounded in conceptions of fact, to
show that in the long run things will be better under their scheme, calling
upon norms shared by their audience. Just about any other issue we can
imagine will evidence the same kind of disagreement, grounded far more on
fact assumptions than on anything plausibly considered "values." Think af-
firmative action. "' The war in Iraq." 8 Tax cuts for the rich." 9 Rent con-
trol.120 You name it.
the Undermining of Democratic Citizenship, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 213 (1996); Peter Edelman,
The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done, 279 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 3, March 1997, at 43-58; Lucy
A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs Welfare Legislation
& Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159 (1995); Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Be-
havior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719 (1992).
116. See, e.g., Jeffrey Ball, Changing Climate: New Market Shows Industry Moving On Global
Warming, Even as Bush Opposes Kyoto, Firms Are Trading Rights To Emit Greenhouse Gases,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2003, at Al; John J. Fialka, The Economy: EPA Shifts Emissions Rules for
Utilities, Factories, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2002, at A2.
117. The debate about affirmative action has resurfaced with a marked intensity in early 2003, as
the United States Supreme Court hears arguments in the challenge to the admissions program of
University of Michigan Law School. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted, No. 02-241 2002 U.S. LEXIS 8677 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2002). For a sampling of the debate,
showing how the supporters and opponents rely on contested factual and predictive claims see, e.g.,
DEREK BOK & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER (1998); RONALD DWORKIN,
SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 409-26 (2000) (supportive of a pro-
gram like that used by the University of Michigan); John A. Bunzel, Affirmative Action in Higher
Education: A Dilemma of Conflicting Principles, HOOVER INSTITUTION, ESSAYS IN PUBLIC POLICY
(July 1998); TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE CASE FOR COLORBLIND
JUSTICE (1996) (opposing programs like that used by the University of Michigan).
118. See, e.g., John F. Bums, The World; How Many People Has Hussein Killed?, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2003, at IC; Robert P. George, The Cost of Fighting... A Just War in Iraq, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 6, 2002, at A14 (supportive of the war); Zbigniew Brzezinski, The End Game, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 23, 2002, at A14 (opposing the war).
119. See, e.g., John D. McKinnon, Are Tax-Free Dividends the Best Medicine? White House Says
They Would Cure Economy's Anemia, but Other Opinions Abound, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2003, at
A4; Dean E. Murphy, Politics and the Economy: The National Mood; Deep Divisions on Who Will
Benefit From Bush Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2003, at A22.
120. See, e.g., Michael Jonas, Small Property Owners Group Makes Big Splash in Rent Debate,
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If we accept this hypothesis, though, we encounter a serious problem. It
is the following, which I exaggerate here for some effect: on these impor-
tant, contested questions, we do not know anything for sure. I do not really
know whether welfare recipients are lazy. When I read studies telling me
that they are,'' I find faults in the studies, many faults. When I encounter
studies telling me that workfare programs will fail because welfare recipi-
ents are anything but lazy or unmotivated, I find them utterly convincing. I
run my life like I know that I am right, but do I really know that? When I
see my welfare clients in our office in my clinic, everything that I see rein-
forces my belief that these are good, motivated, hard working people who
just got the world's worst breaks. Some of my students, meeting those same
people, see a confirmation of their opposite stereotypes-the clients miss
meetings, they are disorganized, they claim to be disabled because of
"stress," their parents were on welfare and their kids are on welfare, some of
them are involved in drugs. It all fits.
Now, what does this have to do with lawyers and counseling and Enron?
As you might have guessed, I think it has a lot to do with those topics. Here
is why: the moral activism project, as I will call it, correctly urges lawyers to
take responsibility for the unjustified harm that their actions generate. 22
Lawyers must attend not just to what is legal-everyone, activists and non-
activists alike, agrees that lawyers cannot participate in schemes which are
not legal' 23-- but also to what is immoral, or unjust. The message contin-
ues: when you encounter the injustice or the corruption or the unconscion-
ability, you cannot merely rely upon its legality. You must confront its
moral problems. You must do something. 24 Talk to your client. 125 Maybe
withdraw. 26 Maybe sabotage the scheme. 27 But if you go along just be-
BOSTON GLOBE, CITY WEEKLY, Dec. 1, 2002, at 6; Juan Leyton & Roxan McKinnon, A Return to
Rent Control? Yes, It Will Stop Displacement, BOSTON GLOBE, OP-ED, Nov. 16, 2002, at A 19.
121. It is probably difficult to find a credible study (as opposed to, say, a letter to the editor or an
op-ed piece in a tabloid newspaper like The Boston Herald) claiming that welfare recipients are
"lazy." But there are studies from the conservative researchers who make equivalent claims, arguing
that without state-imposed incentives welfare mothers will not find work and will succumb to the
dependency syndrome. See, e.g., Riedl & Rector, supra note I 15. See also Martha L. Fineman, Im-
ages of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274 (1991) (discussing popular images of
welfare mothers as morally inadequate).
122. See RHODE, supra note 11.
123. See, e.g., Pepper, Amoral Role, supra note 108, at 6.
124. This is a central message of the moral activism project. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS
AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 13. For a
review of the activist tradition, see Paul R. Tremblay, Moral Activism Manqu6, 43 S. TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2003).
125. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note I, at 66-67; Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the
Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545,
1563 (1995) (noting the importance of moral dialogue).
126. See Rhode, supra note I1, at 6; Sharon Dolovich, Ethical Lawyering and the Possibility of
Integrity, 70 FORD-AM L. REV. 1629, 1665 (2002).
127. See David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship:
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cause it is lawful, we will hold you responsible. You no longer have the "it
was legal" excuse. You lost that defense some time around 1983.28
But for this advice to apply, the lawyer must "know" and recognize the
injustice, the corruption, and the unconscionability. In the stories that in-
habit the moral activism literature, the bad stuff is unambiguous factually (if
legally ambiguous). A story used by both David Luban 2 9 and Bill Simon
1 30
tells us of the rich man who owes a just debt to the poor man, and the statute
of limitations if asserted would defeat the claim outright, but it would be
wrong (Luban's view) or not lawfully correct (Simon's view) for the lawyer
to assert the statute, even if the court would dismiss the case based on the
statute. With that story established, the moral activist scholars debate
whether a law can be used in such a technical and unfair way. The moral
premise is not really in question-rich people should repay their debts, espe-
cially if they admit them. The facts are not in dispute-the debt is owed,
one guy's rich, the other guy's poor, and nobody lost any documents or had
a memory failure over the years.
But in law offices, clients and client agents do not present unambiguous
stories of injustice, corruption, or unconscionability. Well, maybe they do,
but it is always the other side who fits that description. I do not know what
really happened.3' in the Zabella v. Pakel case, 132 the reported decision that
fits the facts of the rich guy and the just debt and the statute of limitations,
but I will bet that when those types of cases come to a lawyer, the creditor
does not say:
I owe the money. I can afford to pay it. I have not lost any papers
and my memory is clear. The guy's a good guy, and he is poor, and
he needs the money. But let us screw him. Can we find some tech-
nicality?
A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1035-43 (1990) (responding to Stephen Ell-
mann, Lawyeringfor Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116 (1990)).
128. The year 1983 saw the publication of one of the most important contributions to the activist
debate, a collection of essays edited by David Luban called The Good Lawyer. See LUBAN, THE
GOOD LAWYER supra note 12.
129. See LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 12, at 683 (discussing Zabella v. Pakel, 242
F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957)).
130. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1098
(1988); SIMON, supra note 49, at 29, 31-36 (but not citing Pakel by name).
131. Compare Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions:
Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REV. 63, 102-03 (1998) (reporting research into
the fabled case of Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W. 2d 704 (Minn. 1962)) with Roger C. Cram-
ton, Legal Ethics: Lawyer Disclosure to Prevent Death or Bodily Injury: A New Look at Spaulding
v. Zimmerman, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETHICS 163, 172 (1999).
132. Zabella v. Pakel, 242 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1957).
The rich guy has excuses; he has accusations about the poor guy; he has
a history that makes his case far more complicated. Justice is on my side, he
says. The lawyer may suspect that all of this is just twaddle, but for him to
betray his client he must be sure-ever so sure-that it is indeed twaddle.
I suspect that lawyers are very seldom so sure. Not only do we have the
generalized fact uncertainty I described above, but we also have another
critically important phenomenon-that of the influence of cognitive biases
about what people, including lawyers, know and believe.
We all know about the influence of the self-serving bias, 133 the endow-
ment effect,134 the confirming evidence trap,' 35 and the hindsight bias.
36
The cognitive psychologists, led by the early.work of Amos Tversky, Paul
Slovik, and the now Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman,' 37 have been showing
us, quite vividly at times, that so much of our understanding about what we
know, what we believe, and what we find fair or right is not exactly rational
or logical. 138  It is instead, the product of stubborn, sophisticated, and re-
markably predictable cognitive processes which are sometimes rather ra-
tional, but other times deeply distorting. 139
The most important "cognitive illusion" to mention here is the self-
serving bias. "I'll see it when I believe it" is a famous quote, a slip of the
tongue in fact, from one of the researchers in this area. 140 This bias predicts
that we will see ourselves in a favorable light, regardless of the true state of
133. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780 (2001).
134. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1107-13 (2000) (dis-
cussing the endowment effect, which leads individuals to value what they already have over what
they may aspire to have).
135. See, e.g., JOHN S. HAMMOND, RALPH L. KEENEY & HOWARD RAIFFA, SMART CHOICES: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MAKING BETTER DECISIONS 198 (1999) (coining the "confirming-evidence
trap" phrase to describe individuals' tendencies to interpret evidence in ways that confirms what the
individuals already believe, or is in their self-interest to believe).
136. See, e.g., Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post i6 Ex Ante: Determining Liability in
Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the
Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 66-70 (2000).
137. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Amos Tversky, Paul Slovik
& Daniel Kahneman eds. 1982). Daniel Kahneman received the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics.
See Daniel Altman, A Nobel That Bridges Economics and Psychology, N.Y. TIMES, October 10,
2002, at C2.
138. See, e.g., PAUL SLOVIC, STANLEY FISCHHOFF, & SARAH LICHTENSTEIN, Facts versus Fears:
Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
(Daniel Kahnemann et al. eds., 1982).
139. Id. In a talk presented at the Alternative Dispute Resolution Section's meeting at the AALS
Annual Meeting on January 3, 2003, Christopher Guthrie (substituting for Robert Mnookin) pre-
sented a very helpful and extensive overview of the most common heuristics and biases affecting
decision making and attitudes.
140. THOMAS GILOVICH, HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T So: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN REASON
IN EVERYDAY LIFE 49 (1991) (quoting the slip of the tongue of psychologist Thane Pittman).
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affairs.'14  The Lake Wobegon effect 42 applies to many areas of our lives.
We tend to rank ourselves as above average, and quite good, at ethical com-
mitment, job performance, leadership skills, sociability, and things like driv-
ing ability. This bias also predicts that we will interpret ambiguous and even
unambiguous data in a way that supports our self-interest or our currently
held attitudes. Think of me reading studies about welfare recipients.
43
In fact, according to those who study the self-serving bias, its influence
is so powerful and so pervasive that the only people who do not seem to be
subject to it are those individuals with low self esteem, or who are de-
pressed.144 Note that several other biases and illusions operate much like the
self-serving bias. Studies show that lawyers and agents generally are some-
what, but not completely, immune from these biases. 45 There is no doubt
that clients are subject to them.
Here is where I offer my thesis. Why is it that lawyers sit by their cli-
ents' side and participate in these noxious schemes? What happened to the
activism that we taught them in law school? I do not think that the lawyers
lose their souls, as such, or that they aim to enrich the fat cats at the expense
of the 401(k)s of the employees and the small investors. What I suspect
happens is this: these lawyers work with people who, either honestly or not,
defend their schemes with arguments that are not assuredly false, and may
even be quite attractively credible. Either the lawyers believe the arguments,
which the biases help them to do, or they do not have enough of a grasp of
the external facts or predictions to be so sure that the arguments are wrong to
support a betrayal, especially when so much is at stake. Remember that by
definition the scheme is legal, so if the lawyer experiences serious doubts
about whether to abandon or sabotage the plan, that fact (while not counting
as a trump in the moral activism project) influences the balance, one imag-
ines, a great deal.
141. See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of
Self-Serving Biases, II J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 110 (1997); Linda Babcock, Henry S. Farber, Cynthia
Fobia & Eldar Shafir, Forming Beliefs about Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and Reser-
vation Values, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 289, 293-94 (1995).
142. GILOVICH, supra note 141, at 77 (citing CHANCE, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STATISTICS AND
COMPUTING 5 (1989)). In Garrison Keiller's Lake Wobegon, on his Prairie Home Companion radio
show, "the men are strong, the women are good looking, and the children are all above average."
143. For further experimental evidence of the power of ideology to influence how persons per-
ceive and understand facts see Roger Giner-Sorolla, Shelly Chaiken & Stacey Lutz, Validity Beliefs
and Ideology Can Influence Legal Case Judgments Differently, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 507
(2002).
144. Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 142, at 116 (stating that "individuals who have accurate
self-evaluations are either low in self-esteem, moderately depressed, or both").
145. See Rachlinski, supra note 137, at 70-74.
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If all of this is indeed true, if what I am saying is right, then where does
it leave us? If I had more than just two or three minutes left, I would happily
provide you with all of the answers, but I am nearly out of time, so let me
just offer three quick reactions.
My first reaction is this: if the heuristics and biases work as we have
been told, and if what we know (or believe) depends a great deal on where
we are situated, then the long-standing suggestion that ethics should be
taught in context146 needs to be rethought. I do not, and cannot, suggest that
ethics should not be taught in context, but the heuristics and biases literature
does teach us that it is precisely the context that creates the distortion in be-
liefs and attitudes. Once a lawyer identifies with a client, she now sees
things differently from before, directly as a result of that allegiance. 47 It
seems, we need to teach not just "in context," but about how the context af-
fects attitudes and beliefs-what some might otherwise call "values."
A second reaction, following from all the above, is that institutional de-
velopments like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 148 in fact, might be quite valuable
as remedies for some of the biases we have observed. The SEC's proposed
regulations required organizational lawyers to proceed "up the ladder" in en-
146. It is well-accepted among professional responsibility educators that teaching about legal eth-
ics requires explicit attention to context and nuance. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Less is More: Teach-
ing Legal Ethics in Context, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 357, 370-73 (1998); Mary C. Daly et al.,
Contextualizing Projessional Responsibility: A New Curriculum for a New Century, 58 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 193 (1996); David B. Wilkins, Legal RealismJbr Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV.
468, 515-23 (1990) (suggesting that "[c]ontext must replace universality" in training lawyers, and
offering "five contextual categories" for ethical standards); David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is
the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in Legal Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICE AND TROUBLE
CASES 68-108 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998).
147. See, e.g., Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Creating Conver-
gences: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAW. & SOC. INQUIRY 913 (1997) (subjects assigned ran-
domly to one side or the other of a litigated dispute formed different attitudes, about the justice or
fairness of the underlying events, dependent on the side to which they were assigned).
148. Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C § 7245 (2002), directs the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate:
minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the
Commission in any way in the representation of issuers, including a rule requiring an attorney to
report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar viola-
tion by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of
the company.
Id. In December, 2002, the SEC promulgated proposed rules implementing Section 307 of the Act,
including requirements that a lawyer withdraw from representation and notify the SEC if efforts to
remedy organizational fraud were unsuccessful. See SEC Release No. 33-8150 (November 21,
2002). The organized bar responded to the proposed rules with passionate opposition. See, e.g.,
Comment Letter, Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President, American Bar Association (December 18, 2002),
available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/other/commentletter.pdf (last visited February 1,
2003). On January 23, 2003, the SEC approved new rules but eliminated, temporarily, the "noisy
withdrawal" language from the regulations. See SEC Release No. 2003-13 (January 23, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-13.htm (last visited February 1, 2003). The
Commission voted to extend for sixty days the comment period on the "noisy withdrawal" provi-
sions. Id.
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tities when they encounter misconduct, and then to withdraw "noisily" to the
SEC if the entity's agents failed to respond adequately to the evidence of
misconduct. 149 Corporate lawyers have identified a genuine and warranted
concern about those regulations: the influence of the hindsight bias. Their
concern was that things that may look pretty innocent to a working lawyer at
the moment might look quite damaging when viewed by the SEC or by a
jury months later, with the benefit of hindsight and after investors have been
injured. 50  As just noted, the worry is warranted. At the same time, the
presence of such regulations will alter the life of an organizational lawyer in
ways which might overcome the effects of the self-serving biases. The law-
yer after Sarbanes-Oxley will possess incentives to measure conduct which
she normally would process via her self-serving biases by a new standard-
what that conduct might look like to a later observer after things have gone
wrong. From the limited evidence available on debiasing individuals, it ap-
pears that such an exercise may work to overcome the usual self-serving in-
fluences.' 5'
The third reaction follows from this consideration of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. The SEC rules apply, of course, only to organizational lawyers. For
the rest of the bar, their day-to-day work is governed by the ongoing self-
serving and self-confirming biases, without any opposing incentives now felt
by corporate lawyers. Thus, as my thesis has expressed, one would rarely
expect an activist stance among those lawyers, because of those influences.
Assuming (as I do) that such a state of affairs is overall a bad thing, we
might start to think about measures to create similar Sarbanes-Oxley-like in-
centives for non-corporate lawyers. The most apparent idea is that of en-
hanced third-party liability. By and large in 2003, lawyers are not responsi-
ble for injuries caused to third parties, with rather limited exceptions. 52
Expansion of those duties, while no doubt complicated by the sustaining
original obligation to one's client, would have the salutary effect of over-
coming somewhat the persistent tendency of lawyers to support, genuinely
149. See SEC Release No. 33-8150, amending 17 C.F.R § 205.3(d) (2002).
150. See Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 137; Rachlinski, supra note 137, at 67-74.
151. See Babcock, Loewenstein & Issacharoff, supra note 148, at 922-23.
152. See, e.g., Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E. 2d 542, 544-46 (Mass. 1994) (attorney for a trustee does
not owe a duty to the beneficiaries); Kurker v. Hill, 689 N.E. 2d 833, 835-36 (Mass. Ct. App. 1998)
(attorney for a shareholder in close corporation did not owe a fiduciary duty to other shareholder
even though the shareholders owed each other a fiduciary duty). See generally, RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (2000) (documenting limited liability to noncli-
ents); Edward S. Cheng, An Attorney s Duty to Non-Clients, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 55 (2002).
and in good faith, the positions of their clients, even in the face of apparent
injustices to others.
IV. THE VIRTUE OF FRIENDSHIP IN LEGAL COUNSELING
Thomas L. Shaffer****
I have been a clinical law teacher for the past eleven years, after nearly
thirty years in classroom teaching. I suppose the word "virtue" in my title
points to the pre-clinic years, when I wrote about ethical subjects such as the
virtues, and perhaps the "friendship" part points to the clinical years, to my
work with student lawyers and their clients, whom I regard as friends, as I
regard the people I am with today as friends.
I mean "friends" in an ordinary, whenever-we-get-together way. The
notion is advertently personal: a client in our clinic is somebody, some body.
When I talk about my client as my friend, my student's client as my friend,
my student as my friend, I mean to talk about some body. In that way my
being asked about my client as my friend is like Willard Pedrick's story of
the fellow who was asked if he believed in baptism. "Believe in it," he said,
"man, I've seen it!"
One of the student-lawyers in our clinic, Joe, who had a paper to write
in our clinical ethics seminar, coped with Bob Cochran's and my disquisi-
tion on friendship 53 by figuring out who he would lie for. He said he would
lie for his friend but not for his client. That, he wrote, is the problem with
Cochran's and my theory on the virtue of friendship in legal counseling: it
does not take account of the fact that a friend is somebody you would lie for,
but a client is not.
The point is not about telling lies. Joe and I can talk about that some
other time. For now, we agree that telling a lie is serious and dangerous and,
as we both hope, a very infrequent event. But we also agree that a good per-
son will sometimes tell a lie. 54 The issue Joe raised is whether there is a dif-
ference between a lie for a friend and a lie for a client. If you are really
aged, you may remember Charles Curtis's famous little essay of 1951, illus-
trated with three cases he had observed or experienced or both. In two of the
three cases a good person lied, and in the third - in Curtis's view - he should
**** Adjunct Professor of Law, Valparaiso University; Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law
Emeritus, University of Notre Dame; Supervising Attorney, Notre Dame Legal Aid Clinic; member
of the Indiana Bar.
153. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 1, at 40-54, 95- 101.
154. See id. at 82-92. See also Thomas L. Shaffer, On Lying for Clients, I JOURNAL OF THE
INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF LEGAL ETHICS 155 (1996), reprinted in 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 195
(1996).
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have. In our book, Bob Cochran and I added the biblical matriarch Rebecca,
who lied for her child, and Atticus Finch, who lied for his neighbor. 55
Joe understands those stories. Where he balks is in adding clients to the
people he might find himself telling lies for. Joe makes the distinction
Charles Curtis refused to make: "The relation between a lawyer and his cli-
ent is one of the intimate relations." Curtis said:
You would lie for your wife. You would lie for your child. There
are others with whom you are intimate enough, close enough, to lie
for them when you would not lie for yourself. At what point do you
stop lying for them? I don't know and you are notsure.
56
Atticus Finch, Southern Gentleman lawyer, would also say he does not
know. He told a lie to protect his neighbor, who might well have been his
client, but he would not pretend (as Letwin said of Trollope's gentlemen) 57
that he had not lied. 158 This is the sort of reflection my friend Joe invited me
to undertake, as he left me with two things to scratch my head about.
First, Joe's reading of Cochran's and my position leaves our friendship
theory too thin - leaves it sounding too much like Charles Fried's lawyer-as-
friend theory." 9 Joe drove me to think of a third analogy, keeping secrets. I
think of the tilting Deborah Rhode and I have done over her severe proposal
to limit confidentiality, 60 which, maybe, can be thought of as her saying
there are circumstances in which a lawyer, although he would not tell on his
friend, should tell on his client. The analogy is that perhaps Joe would tell
on his client, but not tell on his friend. (I did not ask.)
When the Virginia Supreme Court adopted its whistle-blower confiden-
tiality rule, I got assigned to a Continuing Legal Education slot, to explain
what the court had done. I prepared by talking to a succession of seasoned
Virginia lawyers, all of whom told me they did not care what the Supreme
Court said; they would never tell on a client. I sensed that their morals in
that regard were fundamental to their understanding of themselves in law
155. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 1, at 87-90.
156. Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1951), reprinted in THOMAS
L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS, at App. 11-3 to 11-5 (1985).
157. SHIRLEY ROBIN LETWIN, THE GENTLEMAN IN TROLLOPE: INDIVIDUALITY AND MORAL
CONDUCT 72 (1982).
158. HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (McClelland & Stewart) (Reprint 1988);this episode
is described and discussed in SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 155, at 11-16.
159. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend. The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client, 85 YALE
L.J. 1060(1976).
160. RHODE, supra note 11, at 106 (2000); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Irony of Lawyers' Justice in
America 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857 (2002).
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practice. Confidentiality, to them, is an important element in a broader un-
derstanding of themselves as lawyers - a matter of trust is the way many of
them put it. 161
I suspect that the way Joe feels about his friend, whom he would lie for,
is like the way those Virginia lawyers feel about their clients. In both cases
the conversations I had were less about concepts than about personal experi-
ence. To quote a line that has come up several times in our discussions in
Washington, a statement of our agenda - the question is: how do you bring
your morals to your client? (And maybe the answer is like the one on the
first page of Heidegger's metaphysics: why do you ask?)
One answer to that question seems to me to assume that my client is a
means to somebody else's end - my own, for example, or the state's. I need
to tell my friends Deborah Rhode and Bill Simon (I think I have) that they
need to be on the lookout for that possibility when they propose systems for
regulating lawyers. 1
62
The other kind of answer, the one I hope my friend Joe will come to, is
that my client is a Thou, in Martin Buber's sense of that word. 63 The state -
the law - may be the noblest work of humankind. But my client is the no-
blest work of God. (That quotation is not from the Bible; it is from the U.S.
Reports.164) This other, my client, is the context; the law is not the context;
the law is a tool box. My favorite memory from practicing law in a large
corporate law firm is a corporate lawyer who would listen carefully to his
client's business project, and then say, "that is a good idea." He would then
think about what he had in his lawyer's tool box and add, "there must be
some way we can do it."
What I hope for Joe is that he will use the sense of friend he brought
with him to law school, that he will find a way to think of his clients that
way, which is the way Virginia lawyers think of their clients, that he will
find the skill for listening to them as he listens to his friends, and that he will
listen until he sees who they are and knows what they need from him.
The second thing about my exchange with Joe is this: does Aristotelian
friendship, the most substantive of traditional notions, 65 fit into what Joe is
talking about? I think it does fit, if Aristotle or I can persuade Joe that
friendship is dynamic. Friendship is collaboration in the good; friends have
161. Thomas L. Shaffer, Beyond the Rules: The Responsibility and Role of Continuing Legal Edu-
cation to Teach Alternative Ethical Considerations, in C.L.E. THE LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES IN
AN EVOLVING PROFESSION 493, 587 (American Law Institute) (1988).
162. SIMON, supra note 13; Thomas L. Shaffer, Should a Christian Lawyer Sign Up For Simon's
Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 903 (1999).
163. As in "where You [Thou] is said there is no something.. no borders.. the world as experi-
ence... the world of relation." MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU 55-59 (Walter Kaufmann trans. 1972).
164. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 DALL. 419, 462-63 (1793).
165. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOKS VIII AND IX, (Martin Oswald trans. Prentice
Hall College Div.) (1962).
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no need of justice. It is all of that, as Aristotle said, but a lawyer and her cli-
ent have to make their way to friendship. They do not start out not needing
justice.
My favorite example is the relationship between Jerry Kennedy, George
V. Higgins's street-wise Boston criminal defense lawyer, and his client,
Cadillac Teddy Franklin, designer car thief. Jerry keeps Teddy out of jail.
Teddy helps Jerry make his style in the courtroom more honest: "You're
only good when you mean it," he says. 166 Before the story fades away (with
George Higgins's death), Teddy has stopped stealing cars and Jerry has
stopped making a distinction between clients as customers and clients as
friends.
What I want to say to Joe is this: young people do not need a theory to
understand what it is to have a friend or to be one, any more than Cadillac
Teddy did. Student lawyers come to law school and come to us in the clinic
from friendships - many of them, and many of them deep friendships. They
easily and quickly come to work with us and with one another as friends.
And they form friendships with their clients as they form friendships with
their classmates.
It almost frightens me to remember who these client-friends have been;
a clinical student, many years ago, who worked for a man who was in prison
for life for raping a child; another client waiting on death row after being
sentenced for murdering a police officer. In both cases there was friendship,
not as a theory but as an attitude and even a habit-candor with one another,
mutual respect, "some kind of reciprocal equality," as David Hollenbach
puts it in his definition of what friendship is, 167 and which, of course, is seri-
ously unprofessional. 68 (Few of our clients in the clinic are rapists or mur-
derers, but many of them are irresponsible, violent, wimpy, or addicted - not
the kind of people you would want your kids to be friends with.) These stu-
dent lawyers show me that friendship is not a piece of good luck so much as
it is a skill, a disposition, a good habit. Aristotle called friendship a virtue.
Jewish and Christian theology calls it love of neighbor.
69
Each of these observations is a wayto say that friendship is something
that can be worked at - moved from what Aristotle called friendships for
profit or for pleasure - or for academic credit, in Joe's case - to friendship as
collaboration in the good. Friendship, from that classical point of view, is
166. GEORGE V. HIGGINS, PENANCE FOR JERRY KENNEDY (1985).
167. Richard J. Higgins, A Public Affair, BOSTON COLLEGE MAGAZINE, Summer 2002, p. 60, 61.
168. An aside I cannot avoid See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
169. See Stanley Hauerwas, Happiness, the Life of Virtue and Friendship: Theological Reflections
on Aristotelian Themes, 45 ASBURY THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL 5 (1990).
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not something that happens to a person; it is a way to be that one can choose
to nourish and develop. Aristotle called it benevolence, wishing well. Will
Rogers was talking about friendship as a skill when he said he never met a
person he didn't like. Every person he met was a place to start.
In the play Harvey, Elwood P. Dowd spoke about friendship as a virtue.
He said to Dr. Chumley that his mother told him there were two ways to get
along in the world - to be oh, so smart, or oh, so pleasant. Elwood told his
therapist that he had tried smart and recommended pleasant.
A. Three Cases
i. First case: Bad news
I had a client in October, a middle-aged woman, the only child of her
parents. Her mother died last year, leaving a wife's interest in the paid-for
family home to her husband, my client's father. My client's father, the wid-
ower, has four other children, all born out of wedlock. My client's father
told my client he planned to leave the house to one of his other children.
The lawyer who drew the late woman's will sent this client to me, after hav-
ing learned about her father's will. The lawyer sent her to me to see if there
was something she could do to wrest the house away from her father, or, af-
ter he dies, from her half-sister.
I don't think there is anything I can do for her. The issue for a legal
counselor is how to talk to her as I give her the bad news. The answer, think-
ing of my own life with friends, is probably not to talk very much. One of
the things lawyers learn poorly, and that students in the clinic are particu-
larly poor at, is listening. I often wish I could find and hang up in the clinic
a copy of the banner that was popular in the 1960s (attributed I think, to
Daniel Berrigan). It said: "Don't just do something. Stand there." (I have to
admit I have friends who are better than I am at being friends, and they sure
do talk a lot.)
ii. Bush League Cause Lawyering
We have two or three clients who have been ripped off by a real-estate
operator who is a cheat, a liar, and a swindler. I have been working for one
of his victims; another clinical teacher, working with other student lawyers,
is working for a second victim. The city attorney's office has a list of others.
The crook took over my client's vacant house, took an assignment of the
bank loan on it, and rented the house to a young widow. He has been col-
lecting the rent, without making payments on the loan. The loan is in de-
fault. My client came in, as most legal-aid clients do, late in the game. The
lender had already filed a foreclosure action and moved for summary judg-
ment on it - and, of course, the lender's motion included a deficiency judg-
ment against my client.
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Our Clinic director, Bob Jones, and I got together with the students
working on two other cases involving this crook and decided we ought to
figure out some way to join forces and go after him. The problem with my
client going after him, for the common good, a worthy cause, is that it in-
volves a risk he need not take. I can make a deal that will get my client out
of the case without any liability - and that is very much where my client
wants to be. If I leave him in the case - for the common good - it will be at
the risk of taking a deficiency judgment, although he will then be in a posi-
tion to join our other clients and go after the bad guy, which is what the
common good seems to require.
I do not know if I think my client, who is my friend, should take the
risk. If this case were to become a piece of bush-league, local-cause lawyer-
ing, I could talk my client into taking a chance for the cause. It would be
like Dean Houston keeping his segregation clients on the boat, at consider-
able risk of harm. 170 I do not know whether Dean Houston even knew his
clients, let alone whether they were his friends. Cause lawyers are often in
that situation. I know my client. I think of him as my friend. This is not
now a cause case, and I do not know if I want to persuade my client to turn it
into one.
iii. Cause Lawyering
"Cause lawyering" of a more cosmic sort is the third case. The lawyer
in Maryland, who specialized in family law but refused to represent any
men, is one example. She is like William Kuntsler, champion of war protest-
ers thirty and forty years ago, who said he would not represent a person he
did not love. Both of those positions seem less than "professional," to use a
word I do not often use and do not like much.
171
Maybe I can avoid professionalism' with an Aristotelian analysis. The
problem with these two lawyers is that they do not give friendship a chance.
They treat it as a matter of status. The point of view I am urging would be to
treat it as something to be worked at.
170. G.R. McNeil, Charles Hamilton Houston: Social Engineer for Civil Rights BLACK
LEADERS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (J.H. Franklin and August Meier eds.), at 221-240,
reprinted in Shaffer, supra note 18, at 546-555. 1 am indebted also to Professor Douglas 0. Linder's
manuscript "Before Brown: Charles H. Houston and the Gaines Case."
171. As Professor Nancy J. Moore says, in 'In the Interests of Justice': Balancing Client Loyalty
and the Public Good in the Twenty-First Century 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1775, 1791 (2002), "the
concept of lawyer professionalism has been both misunderstood and overused." Id. See also Tho-
mas L. Shaffer, Lawyer Professionalism as a Moral Argument, 26 Gonzaga L. Rev. 393 (1990).
V. ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION
Robert F. Cochran:
Let me exercise my rights as moderator and ask a question to my former
law professor Tom Shaffer. I guess I have a comment and a question. Pro-
fessor Shaffer implied that there would never be a time when you would tell
on your friend or your client, but I think there would be times when you
would tell on either. I think of the example of the Unabomber. It was his
brother who turned him in, 172 and I think it was right of him to do so. In my
view, there are times, unusual times, when it would be right to turn in your
brother, your friend, or your client.
The question I have for Tom Shaffer is as follows: our model is the law-
yer-as-friend. One thing that is striking about the Enron affair is that the ex-
ecutives at Enron were friends with their lawyers at Vinson & Elkins, at
least in the sense that the term "friend" is used commonly today. They were
out on the golf course together and they were members of the same commu-
nity boards. Is that what you have in mind with your notion, our notion, of
the lawyer as friend?
Thomas L. Shaffer:
I don't know if I am a great admirer of the Unabomber's brother. If the
Unabomber had been killed by the state of California we might not admire
his brother quite so much.
The last thing you said is what interests me, and it seems to me that it is
interesting because it is in the corporate setting. I have been in the corporate
setting, both as a lawyer and as a member of the board of directors of a For-
tune 500 company (as a member of the compensation committee and of the
audit committee). In that setting it seems to me that it is not a question of
whether you bring your morals to the relationship with your client, but of
how you do it. The how speaks to the question of self-deception. Self-
deception is a very risky charge to make to somebody. It tends to get people
upset when you say to them that they are victims of false consciousness, or,
if you are a Marxist, self-deception. One of the most useful ways to think of
it in these compensation contexts is to raise the interests of the people at the
bottom, the kind of people Paul Tremblay and I work for. Roman Catholic
thought has invented a phrase with which Protestants and Jews have ex-
pressed agreement, and that is "preferential option for the poor." Raise the
interests of the man or woman at the bottom of the economic pile in the
business enterprise and see how that person will be affected by the compen-
sation decision. Some journalists are now doing this when they compare
172. See, e.g., Wes Smith & Gary Marx, U.S. Seizes Unabomber Suspect; Family's Tip Lead FBI
to Recluse, Chicago Tribune, April 4, 1996 at I and James D. Davis & Damon Adams, Honor Thy
Brother?: Unabomber Case Stirs Family, Duty Question, Sun-Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale, FL), April
12, 1996 at IA.
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paying the boss 10 million dollars a year in salary and god knows how much
in other benefits. How does that look when compared with the worker on
the floor -the last guy hired on the floor of the plant?
Robert Ackerman of Pennsylvania State University:
At 8 o'clock this morning I know the panelists were busy with their last
minute preparations but I had the luxury of still being in my room, listening
to two modem western philosophers, that is the Car Guys (Tom and Ray
Magliozzi) on National Public Radio. They happened to be talking about
friendship. One of them said "a friend will help you move, a good friend
will help you move a body." I thought of that in terms of what I cannot help
but think are some economic and social distinctions that have a real practical
effect, if subconscious in some instances, on the nature of the lawyer-client
relationship and therefore the type of counseling that lawyers provide. I was
hoping the panelists might comment on that. One of the principal examples
the panel has provided regarding lawyers willing to look the other way in-
volves Enron's counsel, Vinson & Elkins, with some 64 million dollars in
billings. As much as there may have been a friendship developed between
the clinical student and the lifer described by Professor Shaffer, the prospect
of that clinical student ever going out on the golf course together with that
lifer and developing the kind of relationship that Enron executives had with
their lawyers is very remote. I cannot help but think that the differences in
status might impinge on not only the relationship but the type of advice, the
type of counseling that follows.
Deborah L. Rhode:
I think it is not entirely coincidental that twenty of Enron's lawyers had
been at Vinson & Elkins before going to Enron. So you are talking about
people who worked together and formed those kinds of relationships and
then found themselves sitting across the table, having some quite uncom-
fortable conversations, but ultimately deciding that it was not "their role" to
give moral advice. That is where I think the counseling literature cuts in. I
agree totally with Professor Tremblay that so many of these situations are
ones where people manage to convince themselves that the facts do not raise
moral issues for all the cognitive reasons his and my paper discuss.
But I think there is also another role dimension that was present in En-
ron as well. One study that I discuss in my essay is a survey that Robert
Granville and Tom Konig have done on ethical decision making in prac-
tice.173 They surveyed graduates of the Harvard Law School and asked some
questions about their Professional Responsibility courses which, according
173. Granfield & Koenig, supra note 90.
to the graduates, were completely useless in helping them resolve real world
issues. To the extent that is true elsewhere, it suggests we all have some
work to do, or at least those of us at Harvard.
A lot of what surveyed graduates encounter in practice they just do not
think about very much in moral terms. One of those interviewed in the
study said, "you know I used to care about how the things I did as a lawyer
affected people, but I don't find myself asking those questions any more."
[That is where I think that] role discussions may have an impact in practice,
even where there are psychological and financial pressures at stake. You
know we want that little voice to be going off and saying, "yeah, but what's
on the other side?" Of course I would like it if part of what is informing that
little voice is that the SEC might sue the lawyer and her law firm. I do not
want to overstate the role that moral musings once heard in a law school
classroom are going to have in changing the course of business conduct.
But, I do think that socializing folks in a way to think self-critically about
those questions is key.
Robert F. Cochran:
I will just give one reaction. It seems to me that a friend might hear
those conversations on the golf course and not say anything but that a good
friend would raise questions about it. When you learn that your good friend
is doing something that is morally questionable, I suspect that you are going
to raise questions about it. I disagree with the Car Guys' definition of a
good friend.
Paul R. Tremblay:
A law school clinic, like the legal services civil clinic where I work,
seems to me the easiest place in the world to be a moral activist in the strong
sense that Professors Luban, Simon, and Rhode (maybe Luban and Simon
more than Rhode), might suggest, where you might have to betray your cli-
ent. It is easy to be an activist there. We give the students Luban to read,
we give them Simon, we teach the activism message. Our clients have no
other place to go, our students have substantial cultural and class differences
from their clients. You would think that to get an "A" you might betray a
client and show the teachers that you are really taking this stuff seriously.
My students, however, resist it enormously; even the conservative students
resist it. They might have all kinds of trouble empathizing with their clients
but if the question is, whether, as a matter of moral responsibility, we should
not go through with some strategy or we ought to report something, they do
not have the courage to accept that responsibility. They rationalize that they
do not really know enough so we ought to give the benefit of the doubt to
the client. But if it does not work in the clinic, it is really hard to work in
Vinson & Elkins.
David McGowan of the.University of Minnesota:
I wanted to put a case to the panel because I am having a hard time un-
derstanding how in practice the differences in the approaches would work,
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and it is a case that I recommend to everyone because it will resonate with
your students.' 74 Enron's a little bit too easy because nobody is going to
stand up and raise the flag for fraud.
The entity, Napster, is created to distribute file sharing software which
individuals use to trade files of music. Some of that music is not copy-
righted, the overwhelming majority of it is. Your students, if you have a
wireless network as we do, may well be doing it in your ethics class. You
will not convince them that this is wrong. They do not believe that copying
copyrighted music is wrong. There are lawyers who advised and partici-
pated in the creation of the entity, whose modal use was a violation of the
copyright laws. If we go to the computer law section at this meeting, there
will be reputable academics who offer substantive defenses of that conduct.
(Napster has a free speech defense, it has a utilitarian defense. If you want
to talk about bottom up and making the least well off better off, there is
Pareto superior copying. If really poor people cannot afford to buy the re-
cords, then the record companies do not lose a sale. And the people who
copied the music are better off.)
What would you say the lawyer in creating Napster should do?
Deborah L. Rhode:
Well, I would not do it. For me that is not a hard case. But I do not
have a sick mother and five children to put through college; the bill collector
is not at the door.
For me the hard cases are the ones like Professor Tremblay's earlier
case, where he said, "if moral directive approaches don't work in the clinic,
where would they work?" Those, to me, are the hard cases. The most diffi-
cult case that I have ever faced was a welfare case. I still recall it from when
I was a law student. This particular client had real subsistence needs, and we
needed to do everything we could to keep her benefits while she was in an
educational program so she could graduate and become self-sufficient.
Nonetheless, if I did not yield to a lot of cognitive biases, I was going to
have difficulty with that position based on what I thought the facts were.
The reason I was willing to stretch in that case, is because I thought the sub-
stantive law was so unjust, because she a had sick infant who needed bene-
fits. Those reasons had nothing to do with my own economic self-interest.
Thomas L. Shaffer:
Well just to take a piece of it, and maybe this is obvious, I would say
certainly there is a moral issue, but I do not get my morals from the law, and
I do not want my student to. So, the state of the law would not resolve the
174. cf. UMG Recording v. MP3.Com, 2000WL 1262568 (S.D.N.Y.)
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moral issue for me, and I hope it would not resolve it for my students. In my
clinical work, what happens is there are some things we just keep talking
about. If we have had to go ahead and resolve it in order to serve a client,
we have done that. But, we still keep talking about it.
Paul R. Tremblay:
The lawyers ought not to have participated and probably will be held re-
sponsible, if it really was plainly illegal. Even if one wants to read activism
(as some do) to say you may do things which are illegal because the law is
so unjust, this seems like an odd use of activism in the case you describe. If,
on the other hand, it is not illegal, then the question is, whether it is so im-
moral that a lawyer should not participate? I do not know whether it is im-
moral or not, based on the facts. I know there are respected arguments that
operations like Napster make good economic sense. So one would have to
sort that out to decide whether what the lawyers did was immoral, even if the
law did not prohibit it.
Kimberly O'Leary of Thomas Cooley Law School:
I recently wrote a law review article 175 that looked at the issue of context
in this matter. We should stop talking about lawyers and clients as if you
can talk about them as one group, because there are many different types of
clients. The power difference between lawyers and clients is a critical lens.
For example, if your client is less powerful than you are, I think you should
always default to client-centered counseling because you should not be im-
posing; you are going to risk reproducing the power problems in society by
being more directive with less powerful clients. If there is relatively equal
power, I think the friend model, that professors Shaffer and Cochran have
proposed is wonderful. However, if the client is more powerful than you
are, I would go for the directive approach.
Attorneys also vary greatly. The experience level of the attorney, I
think, is critical. Inexperienced law students are not capable of offering very
valuable moral advice, most of the time. I try to teach my students that as
you get older and you experience life more, you will be able to do more with
the friend model than you are able to do now. Having someone who is 24
years-old trying to tell someone this is what they should be doing with their
life just does not ring very true because I think they do not know enough as a
general rule.
Robert F. Cochran:
I have actually argued that a lawyer-as-friend would take context into
consideration in much the way that you suggest. 7 6 If you have a friend who
175. See Kimberly E. O'Leary, When Context Matters: How to Choose an Appropriate Client
Counseling Model, 4 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 103 (2001).
176. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-at-Law: Lessons From
Dostoyevsky, 35 HOUS. L. REV. (1998). See also Cochran's introduction to this symposium, infra
notes 1-35, and accompanying text.
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is less powerful than you, as a true friend you are going to try to empower
her. If you are equals you can share an equal sort of a relationship and be
candid. With friends who are more powerful than you, you may not need to
worry about over-reaching - you might argue pretty aggressively that they
should do something different. The difficult thing about this for the lawyer
is that the incentives are likely to be in exactly the opposite direction. When
you are representing a poor client, you typically have time pressures and not
enough time to empower that person and the tendency is to be more direc-
tive. If you are working for a wealthy corporation, your tendency is to defer
to whatever the managers want you to do.
Bruce Frohnen of Ave Marie School of Law:
I would like to address the purpose of this friendship model, or maybe
purposes to which I think it is open. I think this is shown by some sections
from Aristotle that were not referenced. Two, in particular, concern me.
First is Aristotle's position that a good person cannot be friends with a bad
person, 17  and that the attempt to do so over time will in fact corrupt and ruin
the character of the good man and turn him into a bad man.'78 The second
passage that concerns me is Aristotle's view of friends as cooperating in
pursuit of the good. 7 9 I think it is pretty clear that Aristotle would not con-
sider undermining the justice of the polis as a good. That is in fact an evil
thing to do. I wonder if this does not point to the sense in which this model
does not in fact cover a conception of the good in one's dealings, but in fact
ends up allowing one to smuggle in, if you like, one's own conception of the
good. In particular, if one views the law as either being so morally corrupt
or so irrelevant that it need not be paid attention too. The lawyer-as-friend
model does not appear to have the view of law-abidingness as a good that
ought to be pursued by both the lawyer and the client in common, upholding
the purposes of the law and the state that put it into effect.
Thomas L. Shaffer:
It is really refreshing to get Aristotle discussed this way at an AALS
meeting. I think, as a Christian, I have some difficulty classifying somebody
as a bad guy. I am not trying to evade the issue you put, however. What I
want my student, Joe, to learn from Aristotle is that friendship is dynamic.
Young people so often think friendship is just a piece of good luck. "She
and I became friends." But, why? How did that happen? Friendship is
177. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 1159a30 (Terence Irwin trans. 1985) (when there is a
great gap in virtue between two people, they would not even expect to be friends).
178. Id. at I 165b15 (a bad person is not lovable, and one who becomes a friend to him will him-
self become bad).
179. Id. at II 56b5 (good people join in pursuing what is truly good).
something to be worked at. That is what I want to suggest to my friend Joe,
and ultimately the reason why I do not like Aristotle saying you cannot as-
sociate with bad guys. First of all, you have to posit that somebody is bad
before you can do that. Aristotle said, friends have no need of justice. 80
That is, friends who collaborate in the good will figure out what justice re-
quires. You read Aristotle to have ruled out the disobedience of the law, or
of the establishment, or of the old boys who run things. To be sure, the state
rests on friendship, but that works out to mean obedience only when the
state is not corrupt. I do not understand him to have said that for friends to
resist the law (Aristotle did not use words like this), or the establishment, or
the old boys, is a corrupt thing to do. If that is what he said, then I am con-
fused about how to work it out.
Bruce Frohnen:
Is there not a fairly clear distinction in Aristotle between personal rela-
tionships and political relationships? That is, friendship belongs in the realm
of social interaction and more specifically economic interaction, whereas the
polis, because it has to set upthe rules by which we live, has to use a sense
of distributive justice because it enforces rules. Friends do not need rules
because they can act on charity.
Thomas L. Shaffer:
No, I would argue with that. The state rests on friendship, he said,' 8' so
I do not see that. Certainly operationally there are some distinctions to be
made there, but ultimately not essentially.
Linda Beale of the University of Illinois:
I have to begin with an apology. I am a tax lawyer, not a professional
responsibility lawyer, and actually I come very recently from practice on
Wall Street with one of the major firms that works with Wall Street financial
institutions. So my question in this setting relates especially to the Enron-
type situations. It is, in essence, an observation. I think of the "friend"
analogy in terms of the way I thought of friendship growing up. You have
sort of "friend-friends" and "true friends." The problem with the "friend-
friend" aspect of the friend analogy is that you are getting sort of chummy in
a smooth way with your client when you are after the money and that is what
is dominating the relationship. However, the problem with a "true friend
analogy," I think, is that it suggests too blind a devotion to the friend. The
professional responsibility of "zealous loyalty to client" ultimately worries
rne in this respect because if you really think about it, there is underlying any
action a primary purpose that usually drives people's behavior. We have to
be concerned about this aspect of "zealous loyalty to the client," which is
where moral relativism in context comes in. Otherwise it can lead to this ba-
180. Id. at 1155a25.
181. Id. at1155a20.
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sic underlying principle taking on too much power. That value, zealous loy-
alty, should not become so predominant that it blinds us to our ability to do
the kind of thing we really should do in the situation.
Robert F. Cochran:
My comment is the same as the comment I made about the Car Guys'
"good friend." I disagree with you. My guess would be that in your experi-
ence, if you think about your true friends, if you were a true friend to some-
one who was thinking about doing something that was morally questionable,
for example leaving his older wife for a younger secretary, you would
probably not just cheer him on. You would probably say something like,
"Well, think about your wife. Think about your kids. Would that really be a
good thing to do? Are you going be able to look at yourself in the mirror ten
years from now?" That strikes me as the true friend.
Linda Beale:
I should add one thing to what I was trying to say. It is not that a true
friend might not ultimately work as a model if what that really meant to eve-
ryone was reverence and respect for humanity and the human condition, and
taking into consideration all contexts. My point is that I think in terms of the
real world of practice, that analogy will be misleading to lawyers and not
helpful, and that what you need in the real world of practice is some real
emphasis on context and the much broader context of moral issues that have
to come into lawyering.
Robert F. Cochran:
Our time is up. Many thanks to our panelists and those of you who
raised questions for a very engaging discussion.
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